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BYSTANDER EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: MISSING AN
OPPORTUNITY TO STRENGTHEN
THE TIES THAT BIND
What is truth?: Inertia.'
INTRODUCTION
In 1989, thirty-nine year-old Darlene Trombetta was cross-
ing Wurz Avenue in Utica, New York with her fifty-nine year-
old aunt, Phyllis Fisher, when she realized that the truck ap-
proaching them would not stop. After failing to pull Fisher out
of the truck's path, she watched as her aunt, who had raised
her since her mother's death, was struck and killed instantly.2
Darlene filed an action against the trucking company, seeking
damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.3 The
trial court allowed her claim to go forward, but on appeal the
appellate division found that she had failed to state a cause of
action and reversed. This decision was affirmed by the state's
highest court.4
The New York Court of Appeals rejected Darlene's claim
on the ground that because she was not an immediate family
member, she could not recover for the emotional injuries she
allegedly suffered as a result of the accident. More broadly, the
court grounded its refusal on the argument that allowing a
I FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER (Walter Kaufmann ed, Walter
Kaufinann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1967), reprinted in EXISFENTIALISM, at 72
(Robert C. Solomon ed., 1974).
2 Phyllis Fisher had cared for Darlene Trombetta since Darlene's mother died
when Darlene was eleven, and Darlene thought of her 'as her mother." Trombetta
v. Conkling, 154 Misc. 2d 844, 845, 586 N.Y.S.2d 461, 461 (Sup. Ct. Oneida Coun-
ty 1992), reu'd, 187 A.D.2d 213, 593 N.Y.S.2d 670 (4th Dep't), affd, 82 N.Y.2d 549,
626 NE.2d 653, 605 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1993).
3 ihe range of mental or emotional injury subsumed within the rubric 'emo-
tional distress' and for which damages [m California] are presently recoverable
'includes fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation
and indignity, as well as physical pain." Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 816
(Cal. 1989) (citation omitted).
4 Trombetta, 82 N.Y.2d 549, 626 N.E.2d 653, 605 N.Y.S.2d 678.
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non-immediate family member to recover in these circumstanc-
es would expose all tort defendants to potentially unlimited
liability.5 The court's dismissal came despite its acknowledge-
ment of the severe harm Darlene had suffered,6 and contrary
to its definitions of family membership in other contexts.7 The
decision underscored the court's historic hostility to claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress and limited the class
of bystander' plaintiffs in negligently inflicted emotional dis-
tress actions to that select group that are both subject to the
same harm as the injured person9 and are members of the in-
jured person's "immediate family." 0
This two-pronged rule that the court of appeals applied-a
person must be within the "zone of danger" and be an immedi-
ate family member to maintain a negligently inflicted emotion-
al distress action-often results in the denial of recovery to a
person who suffered an injury at the hands of a negligent ac-
tor. Some courts and commentators have marshalled argu-
ments against rules like New York's, arguing that such rules
produce arbitrary results." Others argue that although a rule
6 Id. at 554, 626 N.E.2d at 655, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 681 (citing Tobin v.
Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969)).
' Trombetta v. Conkling, 82 N.Y.2d 549, 553, 626 N.E.2d 653, 655, 605
N.Y.S.2d 678, 680 (1993).
" Id. The court has often defined a family member functionally rather than
formally. See infra text accompanying notes 248-259.
8 A bystander is a person who is not directly physically injured, but who suf-
fers emotional harm as the result of the negligent infliction of physical harm to
another. Bystanders can be related to the person who suffers the harm, or may be
complete strangers.
' To maintain a negligently inflicted emotional distress action in New York,
the plaintiff must have been situated so that he or she could have been subjected
to the same injury that befell the victim, but need not have actually suffered any
injury. Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 NZE.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357
(1984). This is the "zone of danger" rule, as discussed infra in text accompanying
notes 67-84.
'5 This term was defined in Bovsun as those within the first degree of consan-
guinity. Bovsun, 61 N.Y.2d at 233 n.13, 461 NE.2d at 850 n.13, 473 N.Y.S.2d at
364 n.13. In Trombetta, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs
claim, but stopped short of rejecting all other claims. It is therefore unclear
whether only those identified in Bovsun may recover, or whether others such as
unmarried couples could, under the proper circumstances, recover.
" See, e.g., Judge Keating's dissent in Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 619-
21, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424-25, 301 N.Y.S.2d 561, 562-63 (1969); Andrew J. Simons,
Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute between California
and New York, 51 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 1, 9-11 (1976).
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like New York's may not always produce a universally favored
result, such a rule promotes stability and guards against the
specter of unlimited liability to third parties.'2 This Note sug-
gests that cases like Darlene Trombetta's should be decided
under a different rule of law.
This Note proposes to examine the action for damages for
negligently inflicted emotional distress to bystanders as it has
been interpreted in New York, and suggests an alternative
approach to liability. Courts have denied liability on policy
grounds, most frequently citing the fear of widespread liability.
Limitless liability concerns have so dominated the discussion
that New York courts will not even consider a negligently
inflicted emotional distress action brought by a bystander that
does not fall within these narrow criteria-an inappropriate
response that ignores a variety of other available methods to
prevent unlimited liability. Rather than consider these alterna-
tives, the court of appeals has placed the question outside the
realm of traditional tort principles by finding that the putative
tortfeasor owes no duty 3 to a person in Darlene's situation.
To reach this result, the court has clung to arguments that it
rejected in the context of "direct" emotional distress actions in
1961, without advancing a single alternative reason for its
decision.14
This Note discusses approaches to structuring the tort
based upon law and economics and corrective justice principles.
While both approaches suggest important considerations for
the shape of any negligently inflicted bystander emotional
distress action, neither provides a footing for the tort because
they fail to consider the function of the tort in positing norma-
2 Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2410-11 (1994) (adopt-
ing zone of danger test for determining scope of liability under Federal Employer's
Liability Act because of concerns for "unfounded liability'); Richard N. Pearson,
Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm: A Comment on
the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477 (1982).
" For a discussion of duty see infra text accompanying notes 141-144.
14 In 1961, in Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 NE.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d
34 (1961), the court overruled Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45
N.E. 354, 355 (1896), which held that absent a physical impact, there could be no
recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress. The arguments that the court
rejected in 1961 would resurface in 1968, when the court denied liability for negli-
gently inflicted bystander emotional distress where a mother was in the vicinity of
her son's auto accident. Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E2d 419.
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tive rule making. Furthermore, the seeming incommensurabi-
lity of these approaches prevents any satisfactory resolution of
this justice-liability conflict. This Note argues that the best
structure for the tort is one that takes as its starting point the
nature of the interest to be considered. This Note suggests a
possible structure based upon the idea that because the tort
protects personal interests that are in part dependent upon
relational interests, the boundaries of negligently inflicted
bystander emotional distress should be defined using relational
interests as a touchstone.15
The Note will assert that the need to balance the compet-
ing interests of corrective justice and limitation of liability can
best be achieved by applying the framework found in United
States Supreme Court family law jurisprudence limning con-
flicting individual rights. Specifically, the Note suggests draw-
ing upon the jurisprudence articulated in the process of defin-
ing the scope of the due process rights enjoyed by an unwed
father, as articulated in the plurality opinion in Michael H. v.
Gerald D. 6 The unique confluence of family law and individu-
al rights found in Michael H. and cases like it provides a
framework admirably suited for resolving negligently inflicted
bystander emotional distress issues, for the difficulty in bal-
ancing justice and liability concerns parallels the attempt to
determine the scope of an individual right linked to a relation-
ship. This Note will propose that a bystander who suffers sig-
nificant emotional distress when an individual with whom they
have the functional equivalent of a traditional family relation-
ship is physically injured should be permitted to maintain a
1" This Note does not argue that negligently inflicted bystander emotional dis.
tress protects relational interests; that function historically is carried out by tort
actions such as consortium. Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460
(1934). Rather, it argues merely that since the emotional distress suffered is a
function of the relationship, the relationship should serve as the limiting device.
See infra text accompanying notes 29-44.
'6 491 U.S. 110 (1989). This is not to suggest that the right to recovery for
negligently inflicted emotional distress is or should be a fundamental right, but
only that this jurisprudence provides a ready-made (if controversial) standard that
can be used in the tort context for the reasons stated in the text. Justice Scalia's
methodology is proposed precisely because it is the most restrictive methodology
put forward: if a valid interest can be found under this approach, it is lilely that
it would be found under an approach using a higher level of generality. See
Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990).
[Vol. 61:1899
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negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress action
against the negligent actor who caused the injury.
This cause of action rests upon a recognition that the basis
of the tort of negligently inflicted emotional distress to a by-
stander lies in the injury to each individual's affectational bond
by injury to the object of that bond. The relationship with the
victim is the manifestation of that bond. The policy concerns
that underlie the protection accorded families underlie this
tort. This policy can be furthered without incurring unlimited
liability.
This Note consists of four parts. Part I provides a short
conceptual background for negligently inflicted emotional dis-
tress and a brief discussion of the dominant rules governing
the tort. This Part concludes that there is a lack of fit between
the rules and the nature of negligently inflicted emotional
distress. Part HE is devoted to an analysis of Trombetta v.
Conkling and its place in New York case law. Part III consid-
ers models suggested by Richard Posner and George Fletcher
that could provide structures for the tort that differ from the
jurisprudential considerations articulated in much current case
law. Finally, Part IV draws on the theories advanced in Part
HI, lessons from other areas of the common law, and the con-
cerns expressed by the New York Court of Appeals to suggest a
model for negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress
that balances the competing interests of liability and justice.
I. COMMON LAW APPROACHES TO NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
A. Background
The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress has
bedeviled courts and commentators for over 100 years.' The
17 See Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of
Fright A Bistory, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990) (noting that flight cases date back
to the mid-nineteenth century); Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Distur-
bance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1044 (1936); Harold F.
McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1
(1949). For a review of the literature on negligently inllicted bystander emotional
distress and an overview of the theories advocated, see Julie A. Davies, Direct
Actions for Emotional Harrx Is Compromise Possible?, 67 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1992).
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lack of agreement on the appropriate rule"8 and the seeming
arbitrariness of each states' rule illustrate the continuing prob-
lems besetting this area of tort law. The question of bystander
recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress highlights
the struggle to reconcile compensation for losses with the fear
of unlimited liability for defendants.19 On a more abstract lev-
el, the negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress debate
reflects the conflict between justice and efficiency approaches
to tort law. In contrast to the debate surrounding negligently
inflicted bystander emotional distress, most courts have long
recognized that emotional distress2 ° is a cognizable harm.21
New York has recognized this interest since 1958.22 This judi-
cial recognition demonstrates that the interest is sufficiently
important to merit protection and that courts can strike a
balance that includes the competing policies of protecting the
interest and preventing meritless claims.
The criteria governing negligently inflicted emotional dis-
tress are analogous to those in the negligently inflicted by-
stander emotional distress context. First, emotional injury is a
IS As the Supreme Court recently noted in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall,
114 S. Ct. 2396, 2406 (1994), there are three major rules governing negligently in-
fficted emotional distress: the impact rule (discussed infra in text at notes 53-66),
the zone of danger rule (discussed infra in text at notes 67-84), and the Dillon
rule (discussed infra in text at notes 85-93).
' See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301
N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969) ('The problem for the law is to limit the legal conse-
quences of wrongs to a controllable degree.").
o Emotional distress is defined as a reaction to a traumatic stimulus. David J.
Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injury to
Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163, 191-96 (1976); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental
Distress, 59 GEo. L.J. 1237 (1971) (hereinafter "Negligently Inflicted Mental Dis-
tress"). There are two types of distress: primary and secondary. Primary reactions
are those that arise quickly upon the shock of the incident; they include "fear,
anger, grief, shock, humiliation, or embarrassment." Negligently Inflicted Mental
Distress at 1249 (footnotes omitted). Secondary reactions are those that manifest
themselves over time, such as tension reactions that produce "nervousness, nausea,
weight loss ... genito-urinary distress, emotional fatigue, weakness, headaches,
and backaches"; and "conversion reactions" where the trauma manifests itself in a
physical injury. Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress at 1250-51 (footnotes omitted).
2 The protection of emotional well being can be traced back to the tort of
assault. Magruder, supra note 17, at 1033-35.
' Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958)
(liability for mental distress imposed upon physician who treated plaintiff negli-
gently when plaintiff developed phobia of cancer as a result of subsequent treating
physician's remark that plaintiff should be checked regularly for cancer).
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harm that comes about through the effects of shock.' As a
result, the source of the injury is the same for both the physi-
cally injured party and the party who witnesses the injury.U
Moreover, the scope and severity of the injury to the emotion-
ally injured party are verifiable in the same fashion as the
emotional injury to the physically injured party.2 Finally, the
emotional injury usually is inseparably linked with the
plaintiffs relationship to the victim; as the court of appeals
itself has noted, "The impact on a mother of a serious injury to
her child of tender years is poignantly evident."' G The shared
origin, means of verification, and link between the parties all
point to similar treatment for negligently inflicted emotional
distress, whether experienced by the victim or the bystander.
Nevertheless, courts often distinguish between direct and
bystander emotional distress, finding liability for emotional
injury as a direct result of the defendant's negligence, but
refusing to find liability when the bystander experiences dis-
tress. This distinction usually is based not on the differences in
the harm, but purely on policy reasons: since the injury
' Leibson, supra note 20, at 201; Simons, supra note 11, at 22-29; Negligently
Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 20, at 1248.
24 It is important to note that the harm-not the stimuli-forms the basis for
the action. See Leibson, supra note 20, at 196; Negligently Inflicted Mental Dis-
tress, supra note 20, at 1254.55. Some courts and commentators have conflated the
two. For example, the requirement of physical presence or immediate perception is
not relevant to the degree of harm suffered. The New York courts have rightly
noted that the presence requirement has no rational relation to the harm. See
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 618-19, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.YS.2d
554, 561 (1969). Since the tort arises out of a personal injury, the critical question
must be whether the injury occurred, rather than whether the individual received
the stimuli in a specific fashion:
It does not make any difference whether or not the plaintiff was near
the accident scene or whether he or she actually saw it happen. If the
relationship with the victim was a sufficiently strong one, the reaction
upon hearing of the loss can be expected to be the same.
Leibson, supra note 20, at 196 (fbotnotes omitted).
2 Courts are experienced in the determination of the severity of the injury
when the psychic injury is a derivative of the physical injury a victim suffers. See
Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 20, at 1254-60. In allowing recov-
ery for mental distress despite the lack of physical impact, the Battalla court
noted that, as in other contexts, "[W]e must look to the quality and genuinene3s
of proof; and rely to an extent on the contemporary sophistication of the medical
profession and the ability of the court and jury to weed out the dishonest claims."
Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 242, 176 N.,.2d 729, 731-32, 219 N.Y.S2d 34,
38 (1961) (footnote omitted).
= Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 615, 249 N.,.2a at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
27 See Trombetta v. Conlding, 82 N.Y.2d 549, 553, 626 N.2a 653, 655, 605
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stems in both instances from the reaction to the shock, in theo-
ry, any person who suffers shock or fright at the sight of injury
or death to another could be harmed." Courts, reacting to
this specter of limitless liability, have seized upon this idea as
a basis for denying recovery to all plaintiffs (by finding no
duty, or asserting a lack of foreseeability), thereby collapsing
the distinction between those who suffer emotional distress by
virtue of their relation to the victim and those who might ex-
hibit symptoms but share no tie with the victim.
This conflation flies in the face of a distinction that most
individuals make every day. Our experiences tell us that there
is a distinction between the shock we experience at witnessing
harm to a stranger and witnessing harm to a person with
whom we share a relationship. For example, both print and
broadcast press deliver a steady diet of graphic injury, death,
and assorted calamities on a daily basis. Yet the average per-
son, while she may be appalled by these sights, is not so affect-
ed that she cannot sleep or eat.29 In this instance, her rela-
tionship to the people shown in these tragedies is as a viewer
or reader; she has no direct link with these persons. While her
emotions may be stirred, she is not normally so moved from
watching television that she requires psychological treatment
as a result of seeing violence on television. Were she, however,
to have a relationship with a person shown in the press, we
would expect her to react strongly, perhaps becoming hysteri-
cal or falling ill. ° Commentators have underscored this point
N.Y.S.2d 678, 680 (1993) (court bases its decision on "firm public policy grounds");
see also Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A
Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 951-52 (1981). A decision to deny recovery
may also be based on duty or foreseeability reasons. Since both concepts are judi-
cial constructions to limit liability, reaching a decision upon a finding of no duty
is an alternative method of deciding upon policy grounds. "It remains part of this
Court's important common-law tradition and responsibility to define the orbits of
duty." Trombetta, 82 N.Y.2d at 553, 626 N.E.2d at 655, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 678 (cita-
tions omitted).
' Leibson, supra note 20, at 195; Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra
note 20, at 1248-53.
Leibson, supra note 20, at 194.
o See Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd., 532 P.2d 673 (Haw. 1975)
(grandfather in California suffers heart attack and dies upon receiving telephone
call that his grandchildren had been killed in car crash in Hawaii; recovery denied
on grounds that the distance between the parties was too great). See also 3 JOHN
BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss 172-78 (Clifford Yorke ed., 1980).
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by finding that the determinative factor in the degree of emo-
tional injury suffered when a loved one is injured or killed is
the quality of the relationship,3 a fact recognized by
courts.
32
Relationships between individuals, both in family units
and as individuals, are fundamental to human societY The
relationship is a manifestation of the "affectational bond" be-
tween individuals.' Attachment theory suggests that the
affectational bond between humans is instinctive behavior that
originally arose from the need to seek protection from preda-
tors. Its basis in a desire for safety indicates its persistence
over time; while it is most clearly demonstrated in the effects
of mother-child separation, the need persists through life.35 In
later life, the need for safety takes the form of attachment to
an "attachment figure": a person who "provid[es] his or her
companion with a secure base from which to operate." At-
tachment is expressed by both the person who seeks the bond
and the caretaker, and is personal as between the individuals;
there is no necessary relationship between the need for the
relationship and its formal status.
37
The severity of the injury to the relationship will deter-
mine the severity of the injury to the bystander.38 Breaking
31 Leibson, supra note 20, at 196.
'z See supra text accompanying note 26; cf infra note 47.
3See THEODORE Lmn, THE PERSON: His DEVELOPMn THROUGHOUT THE LIFE
CYCLE (3d ed. 1968).
BOWLBY, supra note 30; JOHN BOWLBY, THE BfAING AND BREAENG OF
AFFECTATIONAL BONDS (1989).
's BoWLBY, supra note 34, at 87.
BOWLBY, supra note 34, at 103.
BOWLBY, supra note 34, at 133. Attachment therefore is distinct from the
concept of consortium, for unlike a derivative consortium action whore the lo3s is
deemed to flow from the status of the relation, the disorganizing effects on the
person who suffers the loss of the attachment figure are the product of that
individual's attachment. See BOWLBY, supra note 34, at 128-33.
' Leibson, supra note 20, at 197 ("[M]edical authorities are in agreement that
a bystander who has no relationship with the victim cannot be expected to have
any systematic emotional reaction or suffer any psychic damage as a result of
witnessing the victim's injury."). This assumes that the affectational bond is mani-
fested by the relationship. Despite the seeming obviousness of this statement, it is
important to make clear the relationship between the damage to the bond and the
consequent manifestation of that injury. For example, the loss of a partner may
produce grief; anxiety and anger. These emotions are "usually a reflection of the
state of a person's affectational bonds ... ? BOWLEY, supra note 30, at 40. This
Note assumes that the defendant negligently caused a physical injury to a person
1995] 1407
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the affectational bond causes the bystander to suffer emotional
harm; absent the bond between the bystander and the victim,
the bystander suffers no harm other than a transient fear or
revulsion, which, while uncomfortable, is not actionable.39 In
contrast, the harm a person suffers as the result of shock in-
duced through the negligent injury to a person with whom the
bystander has a relationship is a quantifiable loss that can be
compensated within the traditional tort structure.
Though usually overlooked, the emphasis on the relation-
ship is critical. Although negligently inflicted bystander emo-
tional distress should not be confused with consortium, since
the former is injury suffered directly while the latter is a claim
based upon a loss of the elements of a relationship,4" the two
share a determination that emotional stability should be pro-
tected and a need to quantify intangible values. Like actions
for consortium, which are characterized as derivative,41 negli-
gently inflicted bystander emotional distress actions, while not
derivative, can be characterized as actions based upon the
infringement of an intangible but valid interest.4 Likewise,
(the victim) who has a relationship with the plaintiff, who has suffered severe
emotional distress as a result of this incident.
' Implicit in any claim for emotional distress is the requirement that the
distress be severe enough to warrant bringing an action at law. See Richard S.
Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making
"The Punishment Fit the Crime," 1 U. HAW. L. REv. 1, 40 (1979) (arguing that
while liability should be unrestricted, damages should be limited to economic loss);
Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 20, at 1255; see also Leibson,
supra note 20, at 194; Magruder, supra note 17, at 1066; Simons, supra note 11,
at 22-29.
In an article on intentional infliction of emotional distress, Daniel Givelber
has identified several of the reasons for requiring the distress to be serious: the
prevalence of incivility makes it impossible to prevent it or provide a remedy; the
requirement of seriousness serves as an indicator of reliability; the right to liberty
includes the right to behave in a fashion that may cause emotional distress to
others; and that certain societal situations such as cross examination require a
certain amount of incivility. Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decen-
cy and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
by Outrageous Conduct 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42 (1982). Several of these concerns
also inform the negligent infliction of emotional distress, notably the concern for
verification and the inability to adjudicate all the misfortunes of daily life.
"' Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 502, 239 N.E.2d 897,
899, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (1968) ('The concept of consortium includes not only
loss of support or services, it also embraces such elements as love, companionship,
affection, society, sexual relations, solace and more.") (citation omitted).
41 Id.
I In discussing the intangible nature of consortium damages, the Millington
[Vol. 61: 1899
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the cases that allow for recovery based upon mishandling of
corpses or telegrams indicating death also indicate that the
existence of the relationship between the plaintiff and the
victim is decisive in ascertaining liability.43 In all of these in-
stances, it is the bond-as expressed by the relationship be-
tween the parties-that allows for recovery. The principle is
that a relationship that manifests the functions of traditional
relationships serves as a sure guide. The tort of negligently
inflicted bystander emotional distress recognizes that the inju-
ry is to the affectational bond, but liability is determined
through an examination of the relationship between the plain-
tiff and the victim, making the relationship crucial to the tort.
Thus, while negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress
protects an individual interest, this interest" exists only as a
function of the plaintiffs relationship with the victim.
Negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress protects
an interest important to society as well as to individuals. The
United States Supreme Court has long recognized that families
are important because they promote values that are fundamen-
tal to the maintenance of a civil society.4 6 Commentators
agree: "It is hard to conceive of a good and successful society
without reasonably strong families-multigenerational, domes-
tic groups of kinfolk that effectively carry out their socially as-
signed tasks."46 Similarly, the values that characterize any
court stated-
To describe the loss as 'ndirect' is only to evade the issue. The loss of
companionship, emotional support, love, felicity and sexual relations are
real injuries. The trauma of having to care for a permanent invalid is
known to have caused mental illness.... To describe these damage3 as
merely parasitic is inaccurate and cruel.
Id. at 503, 239 N.E.2d at 899, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
1 See infra cases cited at notes 282-85; see also Magruder, cupra note 17, at
1066-67 (citing cases); McNiece, supra note 17, at 33-37 (citing cases).
4Liability interest is here used in the sense of the phrase developed in Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and rnalienabili-
ty: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972), reprinted in ECO-
NOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 31 (Bruce A. Acherman ed., 1975) (a liabil-
ity rule protects an entitlement by requiring that a party seeking it must pay an
objectively determined value for it).
"See infra note 47.
4' David Popenoe, The Family Condition of America: Cultural Change and Pub-
lic Policy, in VALUES AND PuBuc POLICY 81 (Henry J. Arron et al. ads., 1994); cf.
Beverly Horsburgh, Redefining the Family. Recognizing the Altruistic Caretaker and
the Importance of Relational Needs, 25 U. MICI. J. L. REF. 423 (1992) (arguing for
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stable, long-term relationship are those which aid in the devel-
opment of a civil society, for, after all, it is the function of such
relationships (usually socialization) and not their formal status
that provides the reason for protection.47 In an age where the
traditional family structures provide less and less of a source
for the inculcation of traditional values, it is imperative that
the legal system provide recognition to nontraditional relation-
ships insofar as they perform the same function that the fami-
ly traditionally performed." Negligently inflicted bystander
emotional distress, because it promotes the protection of these
values, serves both public and private interests.
B. A Survey of the Common Law Rules
The common law has long recognized that mental distress
is a compensable injury.49 In the last fifty years, courts have
established that the intentional infliction of emotional distress
is a valid cause of action.5" When the elements of this tort are
fulfilled, courts do not hesitate to find an actor liable to third
legal recognition of caretakers and abandonment of traditional legal posture
disfavoring altruism).
47 '[Tihe importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals
involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attach-
ments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and
from the role it plays in "promot[ing] a way of life" through the
instruction of children . . . as well as from the fact of blood
relationship.'
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
Christopher Lasch calls the family "the chief agency of socialization." CHmRiSTOPHER
LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED 3 (1977).
4 Over 15 percent of Americans live in "non family households" (either singly
or with persons not related by marriage, birth or adoption). BUREAU OF THE CEN-
sus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CP-2-1, Fertility and Household and Family
Composition: 1990 16 (1993).
' The tort of assault is in fact an action for the violation of a protected men-
tal interest. See Magruder, supra note 17, at 1033-34 (noting that as long ago as
1348, courts recognized the validity of a claim based upon mental, rather than
physical anguish). Generally, the action was characterized as parasitic when it was
not related to an assault action. See Magruder, supra note 17, at 1048.
' State Rubbish Collectors Assoc. v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952) (threats
made by defendant manifested intent to cause plaintiff emotional distress); Ferrara
v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d. 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999 (1958)
("Freedom from mental disturbance is now a protected interest in this State.");




parties5 1 In contrast, courts have struggled to fashion a satis-
factory rule to govern negligently inflicted emotional dis-
tress.
5 2
1. The Need for Verification
The New York Court of Appeals was the first American
court to face directly the question of recovery for physical dis-
tress occasioned by shock. 3 In Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.
Co., the plaintiff brought suit after she was nearly run down
by the defendant's team of horses, which were finally stopped
inches away from her. She subsequently suffered a miscar-
riage, and brought an action alleging that the shock of this
accident had induced her miscarriage!' The court denied her
claim, holding that "no recovery can be had for fright cases."
Additionally, the court denied recovery on the grounds that the
incident was not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs condi-
tion; 7 the problems inherent in proving this type of case were
insurmountable;"8 and allowing a claim of this type would
result in a "flood of litigation." 9 The court concluded that giv-
61See R TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 46 (1965), and cases cited therein.
6 Uiller, supra note 39, at 2.
' Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 17, at 827.
6' 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled by Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d
237, 176 NIE.2d 739, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
SId.
s Id. at 109, 45 N.E. at 354. As commentators have observed, the plaintiff was
not seeking recovery for her fright, but rather for the physical consequences (mis-
carriage) of that shock. See, e.g., McNiece, supra note 17, at 26 n.86.
Mitchell, 151 N.Y. at 110, 45 N.E. at 355. Chamallas and Kerber argue that
the court seemed to base its holding most prominently on V. v. Coultas, 13 App.
Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888), another near-miss case. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 17,
at 826. In Coultas, the plaintiff alleged that she suffered a miczarriage as the
result of fright she experienced when her carriage narrowly missed being struck
by a train. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 17, at 826. The court denied liability
in that case, and the authors argue that the denial was a gender-related denial
rather than a proximate cause issue; in short, that the plaintiff was (literally) not
a reasonable man, and so her injuries were caused not by the fright, but by her
own temperament. The English courts later disapproved Coultas. Charnallas &
Kerber, supra note 17, at 826-27.
Mitchell, 151 N.Y. at 110, 45 N.E. at 355. But se Battalla, 10 N.Y.2d at
242, 176 NME.2d at 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37, overruling Mitchell (MThe question of
proof in individual situations should not be the arbitrary basis upon which to bar
all actions . . ").
I Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 354 (1896).
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en these considerations, allowing recovery would be "contrary
to principles of public policy."6 °
This rule-no recovery for emotional distress absent a
showing of physical impact-was followed in a Massachusetts
case the following year. In Spade v. Lynn,61 the court denied
recovery to a woman who alleged physical illness as the result
of a motorman's negligence in removing two obstreperous pas-
sengers next to her.6 2 This rule became the settled law of
most jurisdictions,63 even as the English courts that originally
had promulgated the doctrine abandoned it.6 Once courts
accepted that there was no necessary link between the impact
requirement and damages for fright, they eliminated the im-
pact requirement as underinclusive.65 The issue of the genu-
ineness of injury, however, has remained a factor in bystander
cases to the present day.66
Other courts developed a test that established the accident
area as the limiting device. Known as the zone of danger, this
test requires a plaintiff to be within the area of the accident in
order to recover. "A person is within an accident's zone of dan-
ger... when he is sufficiently close to that accident such that
he is subjected to a high risk of physical impact emanating
from the accident itself."67 If the plaintiff is not within this
zone, then recovery is prohibited, regardless of the actual inju-
ries suffered.68 In its pure form, the rule does not require any
relationship between the victim and the plaintiff6 9 Support-
60 Id.
" 47 NE. 88 (Mass. 1897).
" The facts here are taken from the account in Chamallas & Kerber, supra
note 17, at 829.
'3 Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 17, at 829.
Chamllas & Kerber, supra note 17, at 829. See also NICHOLAS J. MULLLANY
& PETER R. HANDFORD, TORT LIABIuIY FOR PSYCHIATRIC DAMAGE 10-11 (1993).
Pearson, supra note 12, at 488-89.
Trombetta v. Conkling, 82 N.Y.2d 549, 554, 626 N.E.2d 653, 655, 605
N.Y.S.2d 678, 680 (1993) (citing "potentiality for inappropriate claims" as a reason
for denial of recovery); Pearson, supra note 12, at 508.
'6 Hayes v. Illinois Power Co., 587 N.E.2d 559, 562 (I1. 1992) (citations omit-
ted).
' Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 915 (Cal. 1968); Pearson, supra note 12, at
490.
' Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236 (Utah 1992) (adopting RE.
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 and holding that woman who witnessed
water accident from boat was not in zone of danger-no recovery). There are two
major variations on the zone of danger rule, generating confusion. In its pure
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ers of the rule cite its ease of application and its prophylactic
effect against any possible flood of litigation 70 The first
American application of this rule came in Waube v.
Warrington,7 where the court denied recovery to a spouse be-
cause his wife-who while suffering from shock upon witness-
ing the death of her child, had refused to eat and had subse-
quently died-had viewed the accident from within her
home.72
As with any bright-line rule, the application of the zone of
danger occasionally has been criticized as harsh because it
bars claims on the fortuity of the plaintiffs location, which has
no relation to the injury suffered. Resavage v. Davies73 is il-
lustrative. While Ms. Resavage's daughters were waiting for
the school bus, a truck mounted the curb where they were
standing and struck them both, killing them. Ms. Resavage,
who had seen this carnage from the relative safety of her porch
approximately ninety feet from the curb, ran out to the street
and found her children lying in a pool of blood. The Maryland
court denied her negligently inflicted emotional distress claim
because she was not within the zone of danger, the truck did
not come near her, nor did she fear for her own safety.74
incarnation, recovery is granted when the plaintiff is in the zone of danger and
fears for her own safety. The premise offered for this rule is that a near miss is
as good as a direct hit. Pearson, supra note 12, at 490. The second or alternate
rule is the version found in § 436 of the RESTATEmNT (SECOND) OF TORTS, as
adopted by the court of appeals: a plaintiff may recover for either her own fright
or their fright upon their perception of an injury to a close relative.
"o Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 229, 461 N..2d 843, 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d
357, 361 (1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 cmt d (1963); see also
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994) (discussing rules and
choosing to adopt zone of danger test for negligently inflicted emotional distress
claims brought under Federal Employers' Liability Act); Pearson, supra note 12, at
490; Paul V. Callandrella, Note, Safe Haven for a Troubled Tort. A Return to the
Zone of Danger for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 26 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 79 (1992).
71 258 N.W. 497 (Wis. 1935).
72 Id. Commentators have traced the origin of this rule to dictum in Duliau v.
White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669 (1901). See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 17, at 830;
Mciece, supra note 17, at 24 n.78. In that case, the court allowed recovery to a
woman who alleged that she had miscarried due to the fright she miffered when
the defendant negligently drove his horse into the pub where Ehe was working.
Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 17, at 830. For a discussion of the English cases,
see generally MULLANY & HANDFORD, supra note 64.




Although cases like Resavage have aroused the ire of both
the courts and commentators, 75 others have argued that the
zone of danger rule is no more arbitrary than any other rule
crafted to limit liability.76 Moreover, the zone of danger does
provide an effective and easy to administer cap upon the num-
ber of potential plaintiffs, since only those within the zone may
maintain an action.7 7 Privileging physical presence over emo-
tional relationship, some courts hold that unrelated parties
may recover so long as they meet the proximity require-
ment.
78
Using physical presence as a proxy for validating an action
for emotional distress results is improper, however, because
the zone rationale assumes that the only valid cause of action
can result from for fear for oneself.7 Applying this rule in the
negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress con-
text--where the injury is conditioned upon the presence of a
third party (the victim)-is awkward at best. Subsequent
reworkings of the zone of danger rule have removed its ratio-
nale but kept its form. In its pure form, the rule requires that
the plaintiff must have directly experienced the possibility of
harm." The alternative view, permitting recovery for fear of
harm to another but requiring presence in the zone, destroys
the original rationale of the rule and substitutes a forced cou-
pling of unrelated requirements. A limit based upon physical
presence assumes that either presence or direct perception are
satisfactory proxies for determining liability. Yet because nei-
ther is related to the harm in a negligently inflicted bystander
emotional distress action, using these criteria to determine the
validity of the injury is akin to asking "'whether a particular
" See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968); Simons, supra note 11, at
9; see generally Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 20, at 124548.
" See, e.g., Pearson, supra note 12.
See Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 230, 461 NXE.2d 843, 848, 473
N.Y.S.2d 357, 362 (1984).
" See Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236 (Utah 1992) (holding that
governing concern for recovery is whether plaintiff was within zone of danger, not
whether they were related to the victim).
"' See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 915 (Cal. 1968); Pearson, supra note 12, at
490.
' Waube v. Warringtn, 258 N.W. 497 (Wis. 1935). In effect, then, this version
of the rule restricts the action to the directly injured. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 915
(criticizing this requirement and rejecting zone of danger rule).
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line is longer than a particular rock is heavy." ' If the action
is for emotional distress, the limit should relate to the action.
Otherwise, application of the zone of danger rule leads to this
result: the stranger in the zone of danger who witnesses an
accident can recover, but the parent of a child in the same
accident will not if the parent is not in the zone of danger.8 2
It is this result that has been criticized as harsh and irratio-
nal,a and which led the California Supreme Court to attempt
another solution.'
2. Dillon v. Legg and the Problem with Foreseeability
In 1968, the California Supreme Court decided Dillon v.
Legg,n8 striking down the zone of danger rule.' The court
rejected the requirement of presence within the zone, and,
couching its language in foreseeability terms, suggested several
factors for consideration:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted
with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted
from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contem-
poraneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the
, Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwest Enter., Inc., 468 US. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring), quoted in Tribe & Dofrf, eupra note 16, at 1090.
2 Hansen, 830 P.2d 236.
s' See infra text accompanying note 112. Pearson maintains that the zone of
danger rule is not arbitrary when the gravamen of the tort is fear for onoself. He
does concede that the application of this rule to a tort whore gravamen was "fore-
seeable emotional harm" would generate arbitrary results. Pearson, eupra note 12,
at 490.
1 This requirement that the plaintiff be aware of the po3sibility for harm to
the self as applied to bystander actions generates the perverce result that plain-
tiffs are in effect penalized for not being afraid for themselves. See Dillon v. Legg,
441 P.2d 912, 915 (Cal. 1968). Since fright has no demonstrable value either so-
cially or from a utilitarian perspective, it is difficult to justify a policy that in
effect places a preference upon fear for one's own safety rather than fear for oth-
ers. For a discussion as to the value of placing any preference upon altruism, cee
MARK KELIAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 119 (1987), and Horsburgh,
eupra note 46.
1 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), overruling Amaya v. Home Ice Co., 379 P.2d 513
(Cal. 1962).
8 In Dillon, a mother and daughter watched as a truck hit another family
member. The court struck down the zone of danger rule, citing the arbitrariness of
a rule that allowed the sister within the zone of danger to recover, but prohibited
the injured child's mother from recovering because she was outside the zone.
Dillon, 441 P.2d at 914.
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accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim
were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the
presence of only a distant relationship.'s
Because the opinion attempted to move beyond the zone of
danger rule and craft a standard more in keeping with the
"general rules of tort law"" it did not set a specific standard
but rather suggested these principles as a means for working
out a series of rules. This approach soon ran into difficulty.
First, lower courts applied the Dillon factors in a mechanical
fashion, generating results that were at least as arbitrary as
those obtained under a zone of danger rule. 9 Second, because
the court couched the Dillon rules in the language of foresee-
ability,9" and defined duty essentially as a function of foresee-
ability, the elusive concept of foreseeability came to dominate
the decisions.91 Ultimately, the court called a halt, first refus-
ing to extend the Dillon rule to unmarried cohabitants,92 and
then freezing the rule.9" In freezing the rule, the court did not
attempt to fashion a new analysis but merely capped the
Dillon limits. In doing so, the court retreated to a position
8' Id. at 920. As the Supreme Court noted in Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2407 (1994), 23 jurisdictions have adopted the Dillon
rules.
's Dillon, 441 P.2d at 924.
s' Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 821-25 (Cal. 1989) (discussing the history
of post Dillon negligently inflicted emotional distress claims and finding the results
"murky"); Pearson, supra note 12, at 490-501.
" Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968) ("Since the chief element in
determining whether defendant owes a duty or an obligation to plaintiff is the
foreseeability of the risk, that factor will be of prime concern in every case.").
" Thing, 771 P.2d at 826-27. Foreseeability and duty are related but not iden-
tical concepts. Both function as devices to limit the scope of liability. Foreseebili-
ty-the requirement that the injury to the plaintiff be foreseen in some fash-
ion-will limit liability where duty might otherwise impose it. See Fleming James
Jr. & Roger F. Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761, 788 (1951).
92 Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
9' Thing, 771 P.2d at 821-25. The court tightened the Dillon guidelines by re-
quiring that recovery could be had
if but only if [plaintiff] (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is
present at the scene of the injury producing event at the time it occurs
and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a
result suffers serious emotional distress ... which is not an abnormal
response to the circumstances.
Id. at 829-30 (footnotes omitted). In defining "closely related" the court stated that
"absent exceptional circumstances, recovery should be limited to relatives residing
in the same household, or parents, siblings, children, and grandparents of the
victim." Id. at 829 n.10.
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similar to the zone of danger approach, increasing the discon-
tinuity between the rule and its underlying concerns. The
discontinuity illuminates the lack of a coherent foundation for
the tort, without which it is exceedingly difficult to articulate a
coherent rationale for limiting liability. To impose an arbitrary
cap without considering the results is not defensible from ei-
ther an economic or social perspective.
In New York, the court of appeals has cited the California
experience repeatedly as a basis for its refusal to expand the
scope of the tort, 4 consistently characterizing its refusal as
stemming in part from Dillon's reliance on foreseeability,95
noting, as do the California courts, that pure foreseeability
proves too much. 6 Yet there is a fundamental difference in
the method of analysis between the New York courts and the
California courts. Under the Dillon approach in California,
duty is established as a function of foreseeability; foreseeability
creates the class of potential plaintiffs. In New York duty pre-
cedes foreseeability.9 7 Thus foreseeability operates as a limit-
ing device in New York, and not as a device to further liability,
" See Trombetta v. Conkling, 82 N.Y.2d 549, 553, 626 N..2.d 653, 655, 605
N.Y.S.2d 678, 680 (1993) (citing cases).
" See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 NXE.2d 419, 422, 301
N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969).
Id.; Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989).
SForeseesability should not be confused with duty." Pulka v. Edelman, 40
N.Y.2d 781, 785, 358 NE.2d 1019, 1022, 390 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396 (1976) (parking
garage not liable to pedestrian injured by motorist exiting garage); ree alo
Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399, 402, 482 N.E.2d 34, 36, 492 N.Y.S.2d
555, 557 (1985) (holding that electric utility had no duty to tenant of apartment
building injured in fall during utility blackout and that "[duty in negligence caras
is defined neither by foreseeability of injury . . . nor by privity of contract) (cita-
tion omitted).
Judge Cardozo established the temporal relationship between duty and fore-
seeabilty: '[the question of liability is always anterior to the question of the mea-
sure of the consequences that go with liability.' Palsgraf v. Long Island RR. Co,
248 N.Y. 339, 346, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928).
Generally, duty is considered an analytically distinct concept from forerseabili-
ty, which, like proximate cause, is a question of fact. Because forezeeability and
duty are both limitations on liability, courts have occasionally conflated tha two,
by holding that there is no duty because a harm was not foreseeable. In reality,
these concepts exist independently of each other, it is possible to have foreceeabili-
ty without duty. See, e.g., Strauss v. Belle Realty, 65 N.Y.2d 399, 482 N.E.2d 34,
492 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1985); H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW




i.e., the foreseeability per se of a plaintiff does not impose a
duty as to that plaintiff." This distinction is underscored by
the fact that while duty is a question of law, foreseeability is a
question of fact. " Since the New York courts do not accept
the proposition that foreseeability is the sole criteria of du-
ty,"°' the argument that in New York, foreseeability would
" The court had previously stated that foreseeability alone would not suffice to
establish duty. Pulka, 40 N.Y.2d at 786, 358 N.E.2d at 1023, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
The Trombetta court also stated that duty is the prerequisite for liability,
Trombetta, 82 N.Y.2d at 552, 626 N.E.2d at 654, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 679, citing Ken-
nedy v. McKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500, 448 N.E.2d 1332, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1983)
(recovery allowed to dentist for pecuniary loss for loss of practice but not emotion-
al distress damages for trauma as a result of using mislabeled equipment and
administering fatal gas to patient); Vaccarro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418
N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980) (holding that a mother could not recover for
emotional distress suffered as a result of birth defects that daughter suffered after
mother had taken drug during pregnancy); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386
N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (in wrongful birth case no recovery for emo-
tional damages could be had absent a duty to plaintiff parents); Howard v. Lecher,
42 N.Y.2d 109, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 N.E.2d 64 (1977) (no recovery for emotional
distress where doctor failed to inform prospective parents of the likelihood of their
child being born with fatal genetic disease from which child subsequently died); cf.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d at 410, 386 N.E.2d at 811, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 899: "As in any
cause of action founded upon negligence, a successful plaintiff must demonstrate
the existence of a duty, the breach of which may be considered the proximate
cause of the damages suffered by the injured party." (citations omitted).
" Palka v. Servicemaster Management Servs. Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579, 585, 634
N.E.2d 189, 192, 611 N.Y.S.2d 817, 820 (1994) (court determines that hospital
maintenance contractor has a duty to employee of hospital injured by maintenance
contractor's negligent repair of fan); Trombetta v. Conkling, 82 N.Y.2d 549, 553,
626 NYE.2d, 653 655, 605 N.Y.S.2d 678, 680 (1993) ("It remains part of this
Court's important common law tradition and responsibility to define the orbits of
duty."). Although the opinion suggests that the court is merely fulfilling a passive
role by stating what the law is, the court is in fact shaping the law, and so is
following in the quasi-realist footsteps of Judge Cardozo, who wrote that when
precedent and statute are unavailing, the judge "must then fashion law." BENJA-
MInN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF TE JUDICIAL PROCESS 21 (1921).
1"0 The court has previously stated that foreseeability alone will not suffice to
establish duty. Pulka, 40 N.Y.2d at 786, 358 NE.2d at 1023, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
As a limiting doctrine, foreseeability is not the sole criteria for duty. HART &
HONORE, supra note 97, at 263. Hart and Honore suggest that the confusion about
foreseeability may be due to inconsistent, unidentified switching between "practical"
and "theoretical" foreseeability, the former being the amount of ex ante foresight
exercised in a specific context, and the latter being the ex post determination of
the scope of liability. Id. at 263-64. The source of some of the confusion on the
relationship between foreseeability and duty may also lie in Judge Cardozo's
Palsgraf opinion linking duty and foreseeability. Leon Green has suggested
"Cardozo's own decisions have done much to indicate that other factors have much




lead to unlimited liability is specious at best. Furthermore, the
court's rejection of foreseeability-based liability only answers
half the inquiry; rejecting foreseeability-based liability does not
justify failing to consider whether a negligently inflicted by-
stander emotional distress duty can be coherently defined. The
difficulty with Dillon indicates only that. The court erred by
using Dillon's failings to vault to the conclusion that all tests
for limiting negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress
other than a bright line rule will result in chaos. Unfortunate-
ly, this broad brush approach has characterized the court of
appeals's approach to the tort in New York.
3. A Brief History of Negligently Inflicted Emotional
Distress in New York
The decisions of the court of appeals on the subject of
negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress are remark-
ably similar to its earlier decisions on negligently inflicted
emotional distress. In its denial of liability to Darlene
Trombetta in 1993, the court of appeals resorted to arguments
it had advanced in 1896 to deny recovery to Ms. Mitchell.101
Indeed, until 1961, no recovery for fright could be had in New
York absent a showing of physical impact."° Courts em-
ployed this limitation in the (mistaken) belief that it would
limit liability and guard against fraudulent claims." This
artificial restriction often served only to deny compensation to
a deserving plaintiff while encouraging the manufacture of
impact claims. 1 4
One might argue, especially in the negligently inflicted bystander emotional
distress context, that making "practical" foreseeability the solo criteria of duty
would indeed prove too much, and so fail to provide a meaningful limit on the
scope of liability. Linking foreseeability and duty in this fashion would have the
perverse result of inflating and contracting tort liability, as all foreseeable ini-
dents would dictate liability, but liability for all incidents not foreseeable (in the
everyday sense of the word) would be barred. See HART & HONORE, supra note 97,
at 262-66.
101 Compare the arguments to deny liability advanced in Trombetta (as dis-
cussed infra in text accompanying notes 132-135) with those advanced to deny
liability in Mitchell (as discussed supra in text accompanying notes 5460).
102 The requirement of physical impact for maintenance of a claim of emotional
distress was overruled in Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 NE.2a 729, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
103 I&
104 See id. at 241, 176 N..2d at 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37 (finding that the im-
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All this changed in 1961 when a state employee neglected
to fasten the safety belt on a ski lift that held nine-year-old
Carmen Battalla. The child was not physically injured, but the
employee's failure to fasten her in caused her to suffer acute
emotional distress.0 5 The case ultimately went to the court
of appeals, where, in a decision remarkable for its sweeping
tone, the court overruled Mitchell and permitted the plaintiff
to maintain an action for negligently inflicted emotional dis-
tress absent a showing of physical impact.' The court em-
ploys striking language in Battalla: "It is fundamental to our
common law system that one may seek redress for every sub-
stantial wrong.... [Elven if a flood of litigation were realized
by the abolition of the [impact requirement], it is the duty of
the courts to willingly accept the opportunity to settle these
disputes."' 7 Using this language, the court brushed aside the
public policy arguments that previously had been firmly em-
placed as the underpinning for the impact rule.'0 8 In 1961, it
appeared to be a matter of time before the court also lifted the
ban on bystander negligently inflicted emotional distress
claims.
The court confounded these expectations in Tobin v.
Grossman.'09 In Tobin, the court considered the claim of a
mother who heard but did not see an auto accident that left
her two-year-old child seriously injured. First, the court distin-
guished Philomena Tobin's case from seemingly similar cases
that allowed for the expansion of tort liability, finding that
these previous decisions represented only an extension or a
modification of an existing rule, while this case presented the
question of whether a new tort duty should be created."1 Af-
pact rule "penalized the honest claimant").
"0' These facts are taken from Battalla v. State, 17 Misc. 2d 548, 184 N.Y.S.2d
1016 (Ct. Cl. 1959), rev'd, 11 A.D.2d 613, 200 N.Y.S.2d 852 (3d Dep't 1960), reo'd,
10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N..2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
10' Battalla, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.,.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34.
'0 Id. at 239, 176 NXE.2d at 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
108 Id. at 241-42, 176 N.E.2d at 731-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 38 (Van Voorhis, J.,
dissenting).
'0 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 NE.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
"o Id. at 613, 249 N.,.2d at 421, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 557. The court declared that
in most other instances the cause of action had been recognized, but had been
limited in its application by a variety of legal and technological obstacles. The
court did admit that the products liability field had witnessed the creation of
implied new causes of action through the broadening of the duty concept. Id. at
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ter considering a variety of policy concerns, the court denied
recovery, asserting that it could find "no rational practical
boundary for liability."'
The arguments advanced in Tobin are largely similar to
those advanced in Battalla, but the result is contrary. As
Judge Keating noted in dissent:
The majority opinion effectively demolishes every legalism and every
policy argument which would deny recovery to a mother who sus-
tains mental and physical injuries caused by fear or shock, upon
learning that her child has been killed or injured in an accident. It
has been shown that every element necessary to build a case for tor-
tious liability in negligence is here present. There is an important
interest worthy of protection, there is proximate cause, there is inju-
ry, and there is foreseeability. Yet having shown all this, inexplica-
bly, recovery is denied."1
The Tobin majority disinters arguments made in Mitchell and
rejected in Battalla: fear of crushing liability and the difficulty
of limiting the scope of the tort."3 The salient distinction,
therefore, is fact based: here, the fact of a third party allows
the court, without explanation, to recycle previously rejected
arguments. Rather than consider whether it should validate an
interest, the court merely restated arguments that it had re-
jected seven years earlier in Battalla. Because the court distin-
guished the negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress
claim from other areas of expanded liability by developing a
distinction between a "new" duty and an "expanded" duty and
614, 249 NS..2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
m I& at 612, 249 N.E.2d at 420, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 556. The court identified
seven areas of concern: foreseeability of the injury, proliferation of claims, fraudu-
lent claims, inconsistency of the zone of danger rule, unlimited liability, unduly
burdensome liability and the difficulty of circumscribing the area of liability. Id. at
615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.YS.2d at 558.
11- Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 619, 249 N.E.2d at 424-25, 301 N.YS.2d at 562
(Keating, J., dissenting).
'- Id. at 618, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 560. The court also notes
that in contrast to other areas of tort law, "T]here are no new technological, eco-
nomic, or social developments which have changed social and economic relation-
ships and therefore no impetus for a corresponding legal recognition of such
changesL h]ence a radical change in policy is required before one may recognize a
cause of action in this case." Id. at 615, 249 NY.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
This nod to realism gives the court a convenient method for finding that circum-
stances have changed so as to require a change in the law. For example, a finding
that a large percentage of the population does not live in a traditional family unit
might give rise to a rationale for changing the limit of the Trombetta holding.
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placing negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress in
the former category, it avoided having to provide a reason for
its differentiation of this interest from other interests found
worthy of protection. As a result, the court reverted to its pre-
Battalla stance of precluding liability on the basis of a mere
assertion rather than any principled consideration of the inter-
ests at stake.
Tobin posited the rule in New York, and it remained un-
changed until 1984, when the court sidestepped the Tobin
rationale in Bovsun v. Sanpiri."4 In 1984, the court declared
that an "immediate family member"1 5 who was within the
zone of danger could recover for the emotional distress suffered
as the result of perceiving harm to another.116 In Bovsun and
a companion case, Kugel v. Mid Westchester Industrial
Park,"'7 plaintiffs brought actions for emotional distress
stemming from auto accidents. In Bovsun, the father had
alighted from the family car by the side of a road and was
crushed by a car that pinned him between the two vehicles. In
Kugel, the family auto was struck from behind, injuring the
parents and their two children; the younger child died from
internal injuries she suffered when she was thrown from her
mother's lap."8
The court allowed these claims to go forward, distinguish-
ing Tobin on the ground that in these cases the plaintiffs were
within the zone of danger."9 The court stated that the zone
114 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984).
"' The court refused to define this term. Id. at 233 n.13, 461 N.E.2d at 850
n.13, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 364 n.13. The question remained unresolved until Trombetta
supplied the answer.
.. Bovsun, 61 N.Y.2d at 233 n.13, 461 N.E.2d at 850 n.13, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 364
n.13.
17 127 A.D.2d 632, 511 N.Y.S.2d 659 (2d Dep't 1987).
118 Bousun, 61 N.Y.2d at 224-26, 461 NYE.2d at 844-45, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 358-59.
In the course of a long and thorough dissent, Judge Kaye observed in a footnote
that the majority's test required the "contemporaneous observation" of "serious
physical injury" and that a correct application of this standard would require that
the Kugels should not recover since the injuries Stephanie Kugel suffered that
caused her death were largely internal. Id. at 241 n.2, 461 N.E.2d at 855 n.2, 473
N.Y.S.2d at 369 n.2. Under this interpretation, a parent who witnesses the shoot-
ing death of a child might not recover for emotional distress, but might recover if
the child was hacked to death with an axe. The consideration of a need for a
showing of a threshold level of gore illustrates the problems inherent in imposing
an artificial constraint on negligently inflicted emotional distress rather than a
logically coherent set of rules and principles.
1" Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 228, 461 NXE.2d 843, 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d
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of danger rule was the majority rule and that it comported
with traditional negligence concepts, since the defendant
breached a duty to the plaintiff who did or could have feared
for her own safety.12 Adopting the approach contained in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court concluded that the
adoption of this rule did not conflict with the Tobin rule be-
cause it provided a rule that would 'serve the purpose of hold-
ing strict rein on liability' using a "framework of traditional
and accepted negligence principles.""2
The invocation of this language failed to mask a signifi-
cant shift that the court made. First, as the majority itself
admitted, the zone test had been rejected in Tobin as hope-
lessly arbitrary."= Second, as Judge Kaye made clear in a
long dissent, the rationale that applied to Tobin applied equal-
ly well in this case." The Bovsun test also eliminated one of
the fundamental principles of the zone test: the requirement
that plaintiffs actually fear for their own safety.'24 Because
the court previously had barred recovery in this situation, the
court's requirements-serious injury, close family relationship,
357, 361 (1984).
'o Id. at 229, 461 NX.2d at 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
12 Id. at 230, 461 NXE.2d at 848, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 362. The court quoted from
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 436(3) cmt. f, to the effect that where a
person suffers emotional distress from the perception of injury to a family member
and both persons are within the zone of danger, the emotionally injured party
may maintain a claim for emotional distress even though the distress arises from
the perception of injury to another rather than to the self Id. at 230 n.8, 461
N.E.2d at 848 n.8, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 362 n.8. The Restatemcnts willingness to coun-
tenance the prospect of a person recovering while in the zone of danger but not
actually afraid for their own safety is an implicit recognition of the arbitrariness
of the rule since the premise of the zone of danger is a breach of duty to the
emotionally injured party. See supra note 69.
1' Bousun, 61 N.Y.2d at 228, 461 NX.2d at 847, 473 N.Y-S.2d at 36L Accord-
ing to the court,
We recognize that our decision in these two appeals may be perceived as
overruling, or at least as rejecting in a significant respect, the rationale
on which our decision in Tobin was predicated, notwithstanding that the
precise issue presented in the appeals now before us was not presented
in Tobin.
Id, at 232, 461 NE.2d at 849, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
m Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 235, 461 NXE.2d 843, 851, 473 N.Y.S.2d
357, 365 (1984) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
As Judge Kaye observed, since in both cases the plaintif' vehicles were
struck from behind, the plaintiffs in both cases were unaware of any danger prior
to the accident, and in Bousun did not see the accident at all. Id. at 241, 461
N.E.2d at 854-55, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 368-69 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
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and presence in the zone of danger--can be seen not as a total
bar, but as prerequisites for recovery. Thus, albeit in a limited
fashion the court did recognize that damage to the
affectational bond should be compensated. Still, in characteriz-
ing the Bovsun result as an exception, the court again missed
an opportunity to tie together policy and rules.
II. TROMBETTA V. CONKLING
A. The Case
Subsequent to the accident that resulted in the death of
Phyllis Fisher, Darlene Trombetta commenced an action in
state supreme court seeking damages for emotional distress.
The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that Darlene
Trombetta was not a member of Fisher's immediate family.
Rejecting the dismissal motion, Judge Anthony Shaheen held
that Trombetta's action could go forward because of the nature
of her relationship to Fisher. In its attempt to define "immedi-
ate family member," the court turned to the policy that re-
stricted the potential claimants to the class of immediate fami-
ly members. The court determined that the governing restric-
tion was the requirement of a close relationship between the
bystander and the victim. Drawing on cases from other states,
the court held that 'close relationship' criteria should encom-
pass relationships other than those based on marriage or con-
sanguinity."" Applying this standard, the court found that
because the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff
and the victim was "more in the nature of a mother/child rela-
tionship rather than an aunt/niece relationship, the plaintiff
should be considered 'immediate family' to her aunt, and there-
' Trombetta v. Conkling, 154 Misc. 2d 844, 846, 586 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (Sup.
Ct. Oneida County 1992), rev'd, 187 A.D.2d 213, 593 N.Y.S.2d 670 (4th Dep't),
affd, 82 N.Y.2d 549, 626 N.E.2d 653, 605 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1993). In his opinion,
Judge Shaheen cited Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Haw. 1974) (child who saw
step-grandmother killed in auto accident could recover negligently inflicted by-
stander emotional distress damages because of the special nature of the relation-
ship between the parties), James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109 (Neb. 1985) (parties
other than immediate family members could recover provided they could show a
significant attachment), and MARILYN MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES IN ToRT ACTIONS
(1982), for the proposition that for purposes of this negligently inflicted bystander
emotional distress action, Trombetta should be considered immediate family.
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fore permitted to maintain an action for emotional damag-
s....126
The appellate division reversed."l Writing for a unani-
mous panel, Judge John Doerr held that Trombetta was not a
member of Fisher's immediate family and so did not fit within
the Bovsun exception. The court reasoned that allowing this
extension of liability would result in an unacceptable extension
of liability. Citing Elden v. Sheldon,' the court stated that a
bright line in this area of the law was essential, and held that
even if the plaintiff had had a relationship that was the wfunc-
tional and emotional equivalent of a nuclear family,' liability
concerns precluded recovery.1'
The court of appeals unanimously affirmed." Judge
Bellacosa stated that the right to recover for negligently inflict-
ed bystander emotional distress did not extend farther than
the immediate family members who had recovered in Bovsun.
The court noted that New York had not followed other states
in allowing damages for negligently inflicted bystander emo-
tional distress, and suggested that the narrow exception made
in Bovsun was the product of the recognition that the plaintiffs
had been put in harm's way rather than a right based upon
the emotional trauma that they suffered.131 Ignoring the low-
er court's relational argument, the court characterized the deci-
sion as a balancing test between duty and liability. The court
did not explicitly characterize the policy interests at stake, but
stated several fears regarding an expansion of negligently in-
flicted bystander emotional distress liability: the difficulty of
containing liability, a morass of case-by-case adjudication, and
the potential for false and inflated claims.'" Contrasting
's Tromnbetta, 154 Misc. 2d at 847, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
Trombetta v. Conkling, 187 A!M.2d 213, 216, 593 N.YS.2d 670, 672 (4th
Dep't 1993).
12 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988) (unmarried cohabitant of victim denied recovery for
emotional distress because relationship did not fall within established guidelines).
's Trombetta, 187 A.).2d at 216, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 671 (citing Elden v. Sheldon,
758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988)).
1' Trombetta v. Conkling, 82 N.Y.2d 549, 626 NE.2d 653, 605 N.YS.2d 678
(1993).
131 Id. at 552, 626 NE.2d at 654-55, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
Id at 553-54, 626 NX.2d at 655-56, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 680. In support of
these policy concerns, the court cited to Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d
399, 402-03, 482 NI.2d 34, 36, 492 N.Y.S.2d 555, 557 (1985) (landlord does not
owe duty to tenant from harm suffered as a result of blackout in New York City),
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these concerns with the "personal tragic loss" that Darlene suf-
fered, the court held that the concerns it had identified out-
weighed the plaintiffs interest.133 The court stated that the
best method for addressing the identified concerns was to limit
the class of potential plaintiffs to a "strictly and objectively
defined class of bystanders.""3 In addition to controlling lia-
bility, defining the class in this fashion would avoid both the
problem of case-by-case determination and problems of proof.
The court confined the class of potential plaintiffs to those who
were members of the victim's immediate family, thus rejecting
Darlene's claim."
B. Analysis
The Trombetta decision is a firm rejection of negligently
inflicted bystander emotional distress in New York. In sum-
marily denying Darlene Trombetta's claim, the court squan-
dered the opportunity to consider the interests involved in
negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress and to pro-
vide principled protection for interests it has deemed impor-
tant in other contexts.
The narrow issue before the court was the definition of the
term "immediate family member." The court restricted the
term to immediately related persons. By refusing to enlarge
the Bovsun decision beyond its facts, the court signaled that it
would continue to reject any attempt to expand a defendant's
potential liability to a third party. Additionally, the court rea-
soned that liability was dependent upon the plaintiffs status
rather than the nature of his or her relationship to the victim.
In making the resolution of liability turn upon status, the
court repeated its signal that the prevention of unlimited lia-
bility was its paramount concern.
In reaffirming this concern, the court hearkened back to
Tobin v. Grossman, which first rejected bystander claims.
and De Angelis v. Lutheran Medical Ctr., 58 N.Y.2d 1053, 449 NE.2d 406, 462
N.Y.S.2d 626 (1983) (refusing to allow child to recover for loss of consortium from
parent's injuries).
'33 Trombetta, 82 N.Y.2d at 553, 626 N.E.2d at 655, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
134 Id.
" Trombetta v. Conkling, 82 N.Y.2d 549, 554, 626 N.E.2d 653, 656, 605
N.Y.S.2d 678, 681.
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Quoting Tobin, the Trombetta court stressed the difficulty of
attaining "essential justice" in bystander emotional distress
cases.'36 Likewise, the concerns articulated in Tobin are re-
newed in Trombetta: fear of unlimited liability, fear of case-by-
case adjudication, and fear of false claims. The weight the
court gives to these arguments is made manifest by the
opinion's failure to discuss the trial court's functional-family
argument. By failing to discuss this argument and instead
simply relying on rehashed Tobin arguments the court sig-
naled that these rationales would trump all others.
The court's focus on policy concerns is crucial, because
policy concerns provide the rationale for denying the extension
of liability. The court characterizes its decision as the product
of a balancing test," but it does not clearly delineate the
competing interests. Instead, it chooses to characterize the
interests as public policy on the one hand and an amorphous
injury on the other." This failure to articulate the interests
at issue is problematic; it allows the court to freely character-
ize the issues in a manner that enables the court to avoid the
contradictions inherent in its reasoning. The court's interest
identification begins with the assertion made in Tobin that it
is not possible to establish a rational limit for negligently in-
flicted bystander emotional distress liability." In contrast,
the court does not clearly define Darlene Trombetta's interest.
Although the court accepts the possibility that Darlene suf-
fered a severe loss, and that she had enjoyed a relationship
with her aunt that was the functional equivalent of a mother-
daughter relationship, the court refused to consider whether
this injury should be viewed as the result of an invasion of a
protected interest. The resulting balancing consisted of an
' The court stated
We have said it before and it has special application here: Beyond prac-
tical difficulties there is a limit to attaining essential justice in this area.
While it may seem that there should be a remedy for every wrong, this
is an ideal perforce limited by the realities of this world. Every injury
has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of tho waters, without
end."
Id. at 554, 626 N.E.2d at 656, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 681 (quoting Tobin v. Grossman,
24 N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969)).
"' Trombetta, 82 N.Y.2d at 553-4, 626 N.E.2d 655, 605 N.YS.2d 68041.
"' Id. at 552, 626 N.E.2d at 654, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 679-80.
Id. at 552, 626 N.E.2d at 654, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
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historic concern for the limitation of liability contrasted with a
previously unrecognized and amorphous interest. From this
point, the decision to deny liability was reached without diffi-
culty, as the court finds that policy concerns dictate that there
is no duty to the plaintiff.141
In using duty to limit the scope of liability the court is em-
ploying a traditional method for circumscribing liability.14 1
While duty operates in part as a limiting device, the determi-
nation of the existence of duty in law cannot be simply the re-
sult of a "yes" or "no" answer to the question "will liability
ensue"? Making duty turn only on this issue effectively collaps-
es duty into foreseeability because once the assumption is
made that the class of potential plaintiffs is not susceptible of
definition, merely finding that the injury is foreseeable will
always result in a finding of no duty. 42 Duty is more than a
tool to prevent crushing liability; it enables courts to establish
the relationships between parties and the scope of the protec-
tion afforded recognized interests.4 ' The court itself has not-
"' The court identifies two reasons for finding no duty: "sound policy and
strong precedents." Trombetta v. Conkling, 82 N.Y.2d 549, 553, 626 N2E.2d 653,
654, 605 N.Y.S.2d 678, 680. Preventing the imposition of crushing liability is the
sound policy, while the strong precedents are those that hold that public policy
dictates that liability should not be allowed to crush defendants. See infra text
accompanying notes 148.51. Thus, pursuant to this rather circular logic, since the
imposition of liability would result in a crushing burden upon the defendants,
there can be no duty to the plaintiff.
141 See supra note 97.
142 Because it resolved the issue by finding no duty, the Trombetta court did
not consider foreseeability separately. Trombetta, 82 N.Y. at 553, 626 NXE.2d at
655, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
143 Judge Cardozo defined duty in this fashion: "The risk reasonably to be per.
ceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to anoth-
er or to others within the range of apprehension." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.
248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928). In dissent, Judge Andrews argued
that this conception of duty was too narrow: "Due care is a duty imposed upon
each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B, or
C alone." Id. at 349, 162 N.E. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting). In New York,
"[Diuty is essentially a legal term by which [courts] express [their] conclusion that
there can be liability." See, e.g. De Angelis v. Lutheran Medical Ctr., 58 N.Y.2d
1053, 1055, 449 N..2d 406, 407, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626, 627 (1983). Duty thus is char-
acterized as a balancing process which must take into account the competing in-
terests in affording a remedy and preventing unlimited liability. Id. See also Dillon
v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1968) ("[lit should be recognized that 'duty' is not
sacrosanct in itself but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations
of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to pro-
tection.") (citations omitted).
1428 (Vol. 61: 1399
BYSTANDER EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
ed that the determination of duty is a complex issue:
Common-law experience teaches that duty is not something derived
or discerned from an algebraic formula. Rather, it coalesces from
vectored forces including logic, science, [and] weighty competing
socioeconomic policies .... These sources contribute to pinpointing
and apportioning of societal risks and to an allocation of burdens of
loss and reparation on a fair, prudent basis.'"
Despite this recognition of the complexity of the duty analysis,
the court fails to articulate any rationale for its conclusion
other than to state that the imposition of liability would result
in a crushing burden, which as previously noted, is an argu-
ment that rests upon an outcome-determinative use of foresee-
ability predicated upon an assertion of the impossibility of
containing the class of potential plaintiffs. Because the finding
of no duty rests upon this assertion, it is important to trace its
origin.
In its opinion, the court cites two precedents for its conclu-
sion that there is no duty. One of them, De Angelis v. Lutheran
Medical Center,45 a memorandum opinion, denies a claim for
loss of parental consortium, which is not recognized in New
York." The court apparently cited De Angelis for the propo-
sition that mere sympathy is not sufficient to establish liabili-
ty: "It is always tempting, especially when symmetry and sym-
pathy would so seem to be best served, to impose new duties,
and concomitantly, liabilities, regardless of the economic and
social burden."147 This assertion restates the Tobin argu-
ment: the court will not consider a new, different duty, but the
court will grant recognition to a duty that can be characterized
as an extension of a prior one.
It is the other case, Strauss v. Belle Realty,"' which illu-
minates the true source of the court's assertion that there is no
duty. In Strauss, a tenant sued New York City's electric utility
I Palka v. Servicemaster Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579, 585, 634 NE.2d
189, 192, 611 N.Y.S.2d 817, 820 (1994) (hospital maintenance contractor held to
have a duty to employee of hospital injured by maintenance contractor's negligent
repair of fan) (citations omitted).
* 58 N.Y.2d 1053, 449 N.E.2d 406, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1983).
'"I& See also Borer v. American Airlines, 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1976) (denying
consortium remedy for children of injured parents).
147 De Angelis, 58 N.Y.2d at 1055, 449 NS..2d at 407-08, 462 N.Y.S2d at 627-
28.
148 65 N.Y.2d 399, 482 N.,.2d 34, 492 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1985).
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for injuries he suffered in the stairwell of his apartment build-
ing during the 1977 New York City blackout. The court found
that the utility did not owe a duty to the tenant. Although the
utility had been grossly negligent, the tenant was not a mem-
ber of a narrowly defined class; the utility provided electricity
to the tenant's landlord in a fashion identical to all its other
customers.14 9 Policy concerns dictated that liability be cur-
tailed even in the face of negligence. Judge Meyer, dissenting
in Strauss, noted that in reaching its conclusion, the majority
had failed to consider any factor other than that the tenant did
not belong to a discrete class. 50 Thus the root assumption at
work is that no duty will be found, regardless of other factors,
so long as the plaintiff is viewed as a member of a general,
rather than a specific class. 5'
In Trombetta the court has again made a similar one-sided
calculation. Moreover, it has not even considered this side of
the equation properly. Ultimately, the court's policy determina-
tion consists of two assumptions: all policy concerns are to be
149 Id. at 403, 482 N.E.2d at 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 558. The court reached the
conclusion that the obligation to the tenant in this case was identical to all others
similarly situated from the premise that the obligation to the tenant's landlord
was statutorily based, and so must be identical with all others similarly situated,
i.e., all of the utility's customers. Id.
'o Judge Meyer stated:
My disagreement with the majority results not from its consideration of
public policy as a factor in determining the scope of [the utility's] duty,
but from the fact that in reaching its public policy conclusion it has
considered only one side of the equation and based its conclusion on
nothing more than an assumption.
Id. at 405-06, 482 N.E.2d at 38, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 559 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
.. This principle was established in Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174
N.E. 441 (1931). In tOtramares, an accounting firm prepared a certified balance
sheet for its client Smith. On the basis of this statement, the plaintiff loaned
money to Smith. As it turned out, the books the accountants used to prepare the
balance sheet were fraudulent, and Smith soon went bankrupt. The plaintiff lender
sued the accountants in both fraud and negligence. In an opinion by Judge
Cardozo, the court allowed the fraud charge to go to the jury, but dismissed the
negligence count. The chief rationale for dismissal was the fear of unlimited liabili-
ty, because the inability to contain the class of potential plaintiffs would expose
the defendants to "liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time
to an indeterminate class." Imposing liability in this situation would "enkindle
doubt about whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that expos-
es to these consequences." Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444. G. Edward White ar-
gues that Ultramares is another attempt by Cardozo to establish a limit to prin-
ciples he had enunciated in earlier tort cases. G. EDWARD WHIRTE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 129-36 (1980).
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subordinated to the specter of limitless liability when the
plaintiff cannot be characterized as a member of a "discrete
readily determinable class,""' and Darlene Trombetta cannot
be a member of such a class. The court provides no justifica-
tion for the application of these assumptions. Even if the first
assumption is warranted in this context, the court fails to
provide a reason for the second assumption. Moreover, it does
not consider any of the other factors that form part of the de-
termination of duty. The resulting determination that policy
concerns dictate a finding of no duty is unjustified, not because
the result is necessarily wrong, but because the court simply
assumes, without consideration, that since no viable method
for limiting the scope of duty exists, any imposition of liability
would be so crushing as to outweigh any interest the plaintiff
might have. s
In addition to failing to follow its own duty calculus the
court makes its policy determinations in a fashion that circum-
vents consideration of the harm that Darlene suffered. If the
court had considered this injury, it would have been forced to
square the finding of no duty with its prior holdings that found
emotional stability to be a protected interest.l"i Additionally,
it would have had to explain why the determination of recov-
ery turns not on the (admitted) validity of the injury, but on
the formal relational status of the person injured, a criteria not
necessarily related to the harm.
The court's rationale for the placement of the line delineat-
ing recovery is suspect for other reasons as well. Taking at face
value the court's argument that the need to prevent unlimited
liability presents a paramount concern within the duty matrix,
the court has achieved this goal by allowing only those specifi-
cally defined family members within the zone of danger to
n" Trombetta v. Conkling, 82 N.Y.2d 549, 554, 626 N.E.2d 653, 655, 605
N.Y.S.2d 678, 680 (1993).
"' For example, the court could have considered the feasibility of an alternative
method for limiting damages, such as limiting them to pecuniary losses, as it had
in Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500, 448 N.E.2d 1332, 462 N.YXS2d 421
(1983).
The denial of liability may also be seen as placing the action under the no
duty rule. Under this rule courts refuse to find liability on the grounds that the
action lies outside the scope of negligence law. Rabin, supra note 27, at 951-52.




recover. In doing so, the court reuses two old assumptions as
proxies: that physical presence and a formal relational status
are the correct (indeed, the only) criteria for determining liabil-
ity. Requiring that the plaintiff be both in the zone of danger
and a member of the immediate family produces only a smaller
class, not a more discrete one.1" Mere reduction of the class
size should not be a surrogate for determining the appropriate
limits of liability. The mechanical tests the court creates do not
test the validity of the harm suffered, as when a separated
spouse or a child who has not spoken to his or her parent in
twenty years can maintain an action but a person who present-
ly functions as an intimate caretaker cannot.
In addition to its one-sided duty calculus, the court ad-
vances other arguments that contradict its other opinions with-
out distinguishing them. For example, the court asserts that
the potential for fraudulent claims is another factor in its deci-
sion to preclude liability. Yet, as in Tobin, the court fails to
provide any explanation for its finding that this type of claim
is more easily fabricated than a direct negligently inflicted
emotional distress action would be.'56 In Battalla, the ratio-
nale for discriminating between claims based upon the difficul-
ty of proof was derided. 57 Even if medicine had failed to
make any advances in its ability to offer proof (or refutation) of
emotional injury since Battalla, the court has consistently
failed to advance any coherent rationale for its assertion that
the proof it will accept in a negligently inflicted emotional
distress action is not valid to show the identical injury in a by-
stander emotional distress action.
The assumption the court makes-that it is impossible to
define a class in a fashion other than formally-is unfounded
at best. By falling back on a strict status test, the court ignores
other New York decisions that have determined the scope of
family membership in other contexts. For example, in a series
of zoning cases, the court of appeals has held repeatedly that a
'"Discrete is defined as "[s]eparate, detached from others; individually distinct
... 1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 688 (1993).
In 1969, Judge Keating noted in his dissent to Tobin that the court present-
ed a case for liability and then refused to allow it. See supra text accompanying
note 112.




family should be defined in a functional rather than biological
sense."5 In these cases, the court has stressed that the test
for ascertaining if a family exists should be based on an as-
sessment of whether the unit functions as a family, rather
than the legal status of its members. The underlying principle
in these cases has been the protection of the values that the
family unit supports."s The Trombetta opinion implicitly re-
jects this approach, holding that liability should not be extend-
ed even to those persons who can "demonstrate a blood rela-
tionship coupled with significant emotional attachment or the
equivalent of an intimate, immediate familial bond.""50 The
court offers no rationale for this decision other than public
policy, 6 thus rejecting without consideration a method of
analysis it uses in a variety of situations to determine the legal
standing of nontraditional groups."e Because the court does
I' See McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 498
N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985) (court employed "functional family" test to find that zoning
ordinance defining a family as either any number of related persons or two unre-
lated persons over the age of 62 not rationally related to stated goals of zoning);
Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning and Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d
266, 380 NE.2d 207, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1978) (group home for children where the
children were not permanent residents and there were alternative parental figures
for weekdays and weekends held to be a single family home for purposes of zon-
ing ordinance); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 304, 313 NE.2d
756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 453 (1974) (a group home for children that "bear the
generic character of a family unit as a relatively permanent household" can be
considered a single family for zoning purposes); cf Braschi v. Stahl Asscs, 74
N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989) (in construing rent-regulation
statute, court held "family" means any association characterized by permanence).
169 In Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning and Appeals,
45 N.Y.2d 266, 273, 380 N..2d 207, 210, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377, 380-81 (1978), the
court stated that the group home's promotion of stable family life would actually
advance the goals that the zoning sought to achieve--the promotion of family
values.
16 Trombetta v. Conkling, 82 N.Y.2d 549, 553, 626 N.E.2d 653, 655, 605
N.Y.S.2d 678, 680 (1993).
161 I&
162 While the court's opinions which employ a functional-family analysis have
largely been in the area of zoning control, the analysis itself is not dependent
upon this restriction. It consists of three elements: permanence, appearance and
fulfillment of traditional roles (e.g., parenting). See Braschi v. Stahl Asso., 74
N.Y.2d 201, 543 NE..2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989) (permanence and appearance);
Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning and Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d
266, 380 N.E.2d 207, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1978) (fulfillment of traditional roles); City
of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449
(1974) (permanence and appearance). If, as argued earlier, negligently inflicted
bystander emotional distress is a tort that derives its legitimacy from the exis-
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not distinguish the concerns that animate finding functional
families in some contexts but not others, the assertion that
policy concerns dictate the result is unsupported.'63 The
court's perfunctory recitation of "policy concerns" serves only to
underscore the lack of analysis, which flows from the belief
that any expansion of liability would result in a tidal wave of
lawsuits, a warning that has previously failed to come
true.Y As a result, the court decided a case largely on argu-
ments advanced in Mitchell in 1896, rejected in Battalla in
1961, and not significantly examined since then.
The court's determination that the potential burden on a
potential tortfeasor is unlimited might seem to be the product
of an economic analysis of the problem, but at bottom the rhet-
oric of liability serves merely to reach a foreordained result.
The court finds initially that while the injury is real enough,
the class of potential claimants is too large." 5 No factual ba-
sis for this finding exists, but this assertion terminates any
discussion about reallocating the loss, for, given this assertion,
the denial of liability will always be efficient.
This argument has two results. First, the court's action
tence of a relationship between persons, then it is appropriate to use this analysis
to determine the scope of liability since it is an accepted method to calibrate rela-
tionships.
1" New York has been inconsistent in its application of the family function
concept. See infra text accompanying notes 248-259.
1' Although Judge Kaye had warned of an onslaught of litigation after Bovsun
v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 235, 461 N.E.2d 843, 851, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357, 365 (1984)
(Kaye, J., dissenting), a Westlaw search indicates that the number of reported
cases that attempted to fit under the Bovsun rule was rather small. The majority
of these cases denied recovery, usually on the ground that the proffered cause of
action did not fit within the Bovsun rule.
In addition to the older exceptions that impose liability, see infra note 282,
there is another exception, as established in Johnson v. New York, 37 N.Y.2d 378,
334 NYE.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975). In that case, the court held that a wom-
an had a cognizable claim for emotional distress where the hospital in which her
mother was a patient falsely informed her in a telegram that her mother had
died. The court distinguished Tobin on the ground that this case followed in the
line of cases that allowed liability for the negligent mistransmission of a death
notice. Id. Additionally, the court found that the daughter here was "directly"
injured as a result of the hospital's act. Id. As such, she was directly involved,
and so the court held Tobin not applicable. Id. But see Simons, supra note 11, at
37-38 (noting that under the Johnson standard there is no geographical limit to
the duty).
1- Trombetta v. Conkling, 82 N.Y.2d 549, 553, 626 N.E.2d 653, 655, 605
N.Y.S.2d 678, 680 (1993).
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prevents any consideration of potential incentives to mitigate
damages or deterrents to the behavior that causes this type of
injury. Second, by refusing to consider shifting the cost of the
accident onto the putative tortfeasor, the court has implicitly
determined that these costs are noncompensable, or that the
victim is in a better position to avoid (pay) them. The argu-
ment that the costs are noncompensable may be rejected on
the ground that identical damages are compensated in other
contexts.166 As to the cost avoidance argument, even if we as-
sume that liability would be greatly expanded, the court's
determination requires assuming that the victim is the "best"
cost avoider, 16 or that "the victims are responsible for these
accident costs." "6c The court does not, however, make any of
these arguments; indeed, it does not mention them. Again, the
rhetoric of "policy" serves merely to cloak a decision based
upon unfounded assumptions in an aura of authority.
The court also fails to explain why traditional tort princi-
ples cannot contain the tort. Since the elements of negli-
gence-damages, proximate cause, cause in fact, foreseeability,
and a violation of the standard of due care--all operate to
provide limits on the scope of liability, the indiscriminate and
exclusive use of liability concerns as a bar to otherwise valid
claims would seem to suggest the need for a compelling justifi-
cation for them. The court's simple, unexamined assertion does
not provide a sufficient justification."6 Absent a strong show-
ing of need, the court should not depart from accepted negli-
gence principles. So long as the court continues to govern the
tort with an externally imposed limit rather than one that is
derived from a consideration of the interests at stake on both
sides, then this rule will continue to produce arbitrary results
that do not advance legitimate state and private interests.
The age of these arguments need not invalidate them;
168 See, e.g., Battalla v. New York, 24 N.Y.2d 980, 250 N.E.2d 224, 302
N.Y.S.2d 813 (1969).
18 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS 175 (1970). Calabresi defines specific deterrence, a collective decision based on
both market and nonmarket factors as to the 'tolerable level of accident costs," as
the process of seeking the 'best cost avoider Id. at 174-75.
163 Id. at 233.
16 The problem of a perception that has firmly taken root but lacks a founda.
tion in fact is a recurrent phenomenon. See, eg., PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 193-97
(514a-518d) (Allan Bloom trans., 1968).
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many tort principles, such as absolute liability for trespass,
have remained intact over the years. Likewise, the application
of principles first derived in another context are not automati-
cally suspect. Yet when the assumptions underlying the rule
are no longer accepted, and the application of a rule in a differ-
ent context leads to results that are uniformly recognized as
arbitrary, then the utility of the continued application of the
rule must be questioned.
The court has placed negligently inflicted bystander emotional
distress claims beyond the negligence system in New York. In
doing so, it has impliedly denied that the goals of the negli-
gence system-whether based on considerations of fairness or
utility or social policy--can have any impact on the infliction of
negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress and subse-
quent harm. In refusing to apply negligence concepts to this
problem, the court has rejected the opportunity to strike a bal-
ance between legitimate concerns, and has opted instead to
turn its back on the problem.
III. TOWARD A MODEL FOR NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED
BYSTANDER EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
A. Characterizing the Interest
Liability for negligently inflicted bystander emotional
distress has been determined by the need to limit the scope of
liability rather than as a consideration of the interests in-
volved. Initial assumptions about liability may well determine
the rule applied. The zone of danger approach does not limit
recovery in any fashion except by pure physical proximity,
providing a rough cut-off point. Since the zone rule does not
link the purpose of the tort with the limit placed upon it, the
potential claimant pool is always vast.
In contrast, grounding the tort in relational interests pro-
vides a coherent limitation device. The existence of a relation-
ship demonstrating the affectational bond becomes the thresh-
old requirement: absent a showing of a relationship with the
injured party, a plaintiff cannot maintain an action since there
is no showing of a cognizable harm.1 70
170 The requirement of a threshold showing of a significant relationship per-
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Regardless of the characterization of the interest, any
system which hopes to respond to the competing concerns that
exist in the negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress
context should consider two prominent goals of the tort system:
utility and fairness.1 7 1 Since these concerns dominate the dis-
cussion of the negligently inflicted bystander emotional dis-
tress debate, it is worthwhile to briefly examine two theories
that attempt to explain the tort system in these terms.
B. Models
This Note will briefly examine aspects of two theories of
tort law: the wealth maximization approach as developed by
Richard Posner, and the concept of reciprocity and risk, as
developed by George Fletcher, to ascertain if either of these
principles can provide a useful framework for analysis of negli-
gently inflicted bystander emotional distress actions.' z This
Note concludes that while both frameworks provide important
insights, neither, standing alone, is sufficiently all-encompass-
ing to provide a normative rule.
1. Law & Economics
The law and economics school argues that tort law can be
explained by economic principles. In brief, the writers of this
school (most notably Richard Posner) claim that the common
law can best be understood as an effort to pursue economic
efficiency: "[T]he common law theory of torts is best explained
as if the judges who created the law through decisions operat-
ing as precedents in later cases were trying to promote effec-
tive resource allocation."7' Although the law and economics
forms two fimctions: first, it creates a cognizable class of plaintiffs who must prove
a relationship; second, it eliminates the need for foreseeability as a guard against
unlimited liability, since the question is no longer whether it was forereable that
the plaintiff would suffer emotional injury, but (1) did the plaintiff have a rela-
tionship with the victim, and (2) was that relationship violated to a significant
degree (indicating damage to the affectational bond)?
1 See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISES AND WRONGS 200-11 (1992). Although these
goals can be cast in opposition to each other, they share many aspects. Id. at 211.
1172 This Note is not an attempt to add to the vast body of commentary on
these theories. Rather, it is merely an effort to apply them to obtain guidance for
a normative approach to negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress.
'17 WuIMi K. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcoNO~Mc STRUcmU OF
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movement has come under wide-ranging criticism for its em-
phasis on utilitarian concerns, its adoption of a variety of eco-
nomic tools to consider legal decisionmaking lends itself to a
consideration of negligently inflicted bystander emotional dis-
tress.174
Before considering negligently inflicted bystander emo-
tional distress claims under this model, several of its assump-
tions should be noted. The overarching principle of the econom-
ic theory of tort law is that its end is to promote efficiency.175
This argument suggests that legal rules (such as setting a
standard of care) can promote efficient behavior.'76 Efficiency
under this conception is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency; any shift
where the "winners could compensate the losers" is
beneficial.'77 Since the goal is social wealth, this standard is
utilitarian in that it seeks the greatest good for the greatest
number.17
8
Several considerations follow from the initial premise. 179
First, since the goal is maximization of utility, the system's
goal is to minimize the costs of accidents and subsequent loss-
es, i.e., to optimize the level of accidents, not to minimize the
number of accidents."8° Second, fault as a moral element is
not a concern of the law. Insofar as fault exists as a concern, it
may be thought of as a societal condemnation of any behavior
that fails to meet a generalized standard of care. 1 ' Third,
TORT LAW 1 (1986).
174 There is a vast body of literature discussing the law and economics move-
ment and its application. For an introduction to the scope of the law and econom-
ics movement, see Symposium, Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFsTRA L. REV.
485 (1980) (hereinafter "Symposium").
17 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173.
17 Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Great Image of Authority, 36 STAN. L. REV. 349,
354 (1984).
177 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 16.
173 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 18.
173 These considerations or corollaries of the initial premise should not be con.
fused with the assumptions made in positing the economic theory. See LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 173, at 12.
180 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 18; STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 7 (1987).
181 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 14. Tort law imposes liability when
an actor fails to act in a fashion that comports with due care. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965). Care is thus the measure to determine the effi-
ciency of the actor's conduct. Shavell states, "[D]ue care is in fact found by a
process that operates as if it were designed to identify behavior that mininzes
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tort law is not an ex ante allocation device and so is not a
redistribution mechanism. *" Fourth, tort law has a deterrent
effect even when analyzed from the perspective of utility rath-
er than in a normative fashion."c
In The Economic Structure of Tort Law, Landes and
Posner find that negligently inflicted bystander emotional
distress claims should not be allowed.' They cite three rea-
sons: there will be no allocative effect if liability is imposed;
the administrative costs are high; and since the amount of
harm that the negligently inflicted bystander emotional dis-
tress plaintiff suffers is small compared to that of the victim,
no effective change in the level of care results."e In short,
whenever administrative costs are high, a negligently inflicted
bystander emotional distress claim that fails to affect the level
of care is irrelevant to a determination of efficient conduct.
This result is suspect because of the assumptions made.
The authors start with the supposition that the probability of
purely psychic injury to an eyewitness is small." Conse-
quently, this injury will have little effect upon the standard of
care, since the bulk of the injuries that fashion the standard of
care are physical injuries. Furthermore, if the probability of
this type of injury is low, then courts cannot ascertain an effec-
tive marginal care rate and potential injurers will fail to take
even costless precautions."' But, these assumptions are
questionable. First, the authors' assumption that it is unlikely
total accident costs." SHAVELL, supra note 180, at 19. The standard of care may be
set according to either a negligence standard or a strict liability standard. Strict
liability regulates the level of activity rather than the level of care; since the con-
duct is of a type that is not favored or has high costs associated with it, imposing
strict liability upon a specific class of activities may reduce that activity. LANDES
& POSNER, supra note 173, at 66.
11 LANDES & POSNER supra note 173, at 15.
183 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 10-12 (citing a number of studies that
indicate that tort law deters behavior); SHAVELL, supra note 180, at 13.
184 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 244-45. It should also be noted that
in an earlier article the authors suggest claims for negligently inflicted emotional
distress should be honored. See William M Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 695, 917-18 (1931) (suggest-
ing that non-bystander emotional distress actions enable recovery of the "real so-
cial cost" of emotional distress, thus Oprobably. . .maling tort law more, rather
than less, effcient").
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 244.
's LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 244.
187 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 244.
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that a witness to an accident would suffer psychic injury lacks
support. In making this assertion, the authors have failed to
distinguish the pure or totally unrelated bystander from the
bystander who possesses a significant relationship with the
victim. While it is true that the unrelated bystander is not ex-
pected to suffer a significant psychic harm, this assertion does
not hold for the related bystander." Indeed, liability has
been denied for precisely this reason: for the related bystander,
the probability of injury is relatively high." If we suppose
that the authors had considered bystanders as members of
disparate classes (related and unrelated), then their as-
sumption regarding the low total incidence of psychic injury is
based upon an assumption that for any given accident, the
number of unrelated bystanders is greater than the number of
related bystanders. This assumption lacks merit." ° Even if
this assumption were true, it does not follow that it is impossi-
ble to separate the related from the unrelated bystander. 9
Since, as the authors note, the calculation of care is made on
the margins (i.e., the determination of liability is made by
comparing the marginal cost of care against the marginal re-
duction of damages), 9 ' any readjustment of the calculation
to consider the increased likelihood of harm may have an effect
on the calculus of care.1 93
188 See supra notes 37-38.
1" In denying liability, the Tobin court stated: "Every parent who loses a child
or whose child of any age suffers an injury is likely to sustain grievous psychologi.
cal trauma .... mhe logical difficulty of excluding ... even the conscientious
and sensitive caretaker, from a right to recover ... raises subtle and elusive haz-
ards ... ." Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 617, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423, 301
N.Y.S.2d 554, 560 (1969).
19 For example, the Tobin, Bovsun, and Trombetta actions were not brought by
unrelated bystanders.
191 See supra text accompanying notes 148-55.
us LANDES & POSNER supra note 173, at 60-61, 87.
13 The authors posit that an economically efficient determination of care must
both lower the possibility of negligent behavior and the probability of the act (acci-
dent). If there is no difference in the probability of the accident when a rule is
violated, then there is no violation. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 232-33.
The authors consider that liability would normally exist in the negligently inflicted
bystander emotional distress situation, except that the probability of the injury
itself-not the accident-is low. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 243. Argu.
ably, therefore the authors may be implicitly bound to the conclusion that if the
probability of the injury is higher, then the standard of care would be influenced.
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 243.
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The authors cite to Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.1" as
an example of a denial of liability where the potential for the
particular harm that ensued was so low as to fail to influence
the standard of care.19 Palsgraf, however, is understood to
stand for the proposition that the scope of a party's duty can-
not be infinite, not that the imposition of liability would not
increase the standard of care.9 ' More importantly, the
authors' analogy between Palsgraf and the psychic trauma
situations rests upon their assumption that psychic trauma is
rare."9 Equating the sequence of events in Palsgraf with the
events in Trombetta illustrates the difficulty with this analo-
gy.
198
The authors' other rationale for the denial of liabili-
ty-that the administrative costs are too high-has been reject-
ed by courts."9 The authors undercut their own argument by
noting the trend toward the recognition of liability in the negli-
gently inflicted bystander emotional distress context."' They
suggest that the basis for the expansion of liability is decreas-
ing administrative costs, a function of the increased ability to
accurately determine psychic harm.2°0 If the probability of
psychic harm has not increased overall, the argument that re-
duced administrative costs alone now enable these actions to
be efficient at common law strongly suggests that neither of
the traditional assertions-unmanageable size or infrequency
of the injury-are valid rationales for the bar.
Application of the negligence formula articulated in The
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
's LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 246.
See, ag., WHITE, supra note 151, at 96-101 (discussing Palsgraf and suggest-
ing that Cardozo's majority decision was a limit on negligence by making it rela-
tional rather than universal).
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 246.
z" In Palsgraf, an unmarked package of fireworks exploded when it fell be-
tween cars of a train after it had been either dropped or jostled loose by a con-
ductor attempting to assist the package's owner onto the train. M. Palsgraf was
injured by a railroad scale that fell upon her, apparently the result of a crowd
fleeing the explosion. See JOHN T. NOONAN, PERSONS AND ASES OF THE LAVW
111-20 (1976). In contrast, Darlene Trombetta and her aunt were crossing a city
street when her aunt was struck and idlled by the defendant's truck. Trombetta v.
Conkling, 82 N.Y.2d 549, 626 N.E.2d 653, 605 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1993).
'0 See, eg., Battella v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 242, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34, 38 (1961).
m LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 245.
201 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 245.
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Economic Structure of Tort Law 2 suggests that in the case
of Darlene Trombetta, liability for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress to her as a bystander would be imposed. If ad-
ministrative costs are no longer a bar, and Trombetta is not a
freak case, then there is no reason to suppose that the incre-
ment in care is too difficult to discern. 3 However, applica-
tion of this formula does not generate a normative rule, for in
theory anyone who could show a harm where the incremental
probability of injury was not low"' could recover, so long as
administrative costs remain low. Because of the unique posture
of a negligently inflicted emotional distress bystander
claim-dependent upon but not derivative of injury to
another-it would be difficult to ascertain the optimal level of
liability. 5 Paradoxically, then, the limitless liability concern
2"2 This is the "Hand formula" as first stated by Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), and held by the au-
thors "to be an accurate description of the negligence standard . .. ." LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 173, at 102. The Hand formula states that negligence will be
found whenever the "burden of precautions (B) was less than the probability of
harm times the gravity of the injury (PL), that is, B<PL." LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 173, at 85.
203 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 244. The authors suggest that lia-
bility should be denied in any case since the harm to the bystander is a fraction
of the harm the victim suffers and that given the low probability of the injury
there will likely be little or no effect on the standard of care. LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 173, at 244. Assuming that the physically injured victim suffers more
than the emotionally injured bystander, the fact that the probability of harm is
greater than the authors posit suggests a greater impact on care than the authors
suggest.
204 When the incremental probability of injury from a failure to take care is
low, this means that the accident is likely to have occurred anyway, regardless of
whether there was a failure to take care. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at
240. In the bystander context, the incremental probability of injury is not low,
since the cause is always the tertfeasor's negligence to the victim. Even if in the
context of an accident between the defendant and the victim where the accident
would have happened anyway, it does not follow for the plaintiff bystander that it
is "difficult to determine whether the nervous injury would have occurred anyway."
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 244-45 n.34.
20" The dependent posture of a negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress
claim suggests that specific deterrence (collective judgement as to the scope of
liability) rather than general (market) deterrence is appropriate, since specific
deterrence allows the determination of liability to be made on the basis of both
market and non market factors. See CALABRESI, supra note 167, at 174-75 (dis-
cussing general versus specific deterrence). Since the accident has already occurred,
the focus should be on reduction of "secondary" (resultant social) accident costs.
See CALABRESI, supra note 167, at 27. Because liability tests based on formal
status are both over and underinclusive (formal status has no necessary relation-
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reemerges in this context because even if the efficiency theory
is descriptively correct, it does not provide sufficient content to
fashion a prospective norm. The efficiency approach indicates
that the tort is compensable but fails to provide a norm to
structure the tort in a fashion that addresses the original con-
cern of limitless liability. This structural inability to provide a
normative rule is the basis for the most sustained criticism of
the law and economics school."' Therefore, while the tools of
the law and economics school are useful to establishing ways of
thinking about negligently inflicted bystander emotional dis-
tress, its own premises-that the sole evaluative criteria
should be efficiency concerns-coupled with the lack of other
concerns indicates an inability to correctly posit a workable
normative standard.
2. Individualism and Risk Taking
In contrast to the utilitarianism of the law and economics
thinkers, other torts scholars have attempted to craft an alter-
ship to emotional injury) they are not efficient. See supra note 37. Given the ease
with which courts employ straightforward functional-family analysis in a variety of
other contexts (see infra note 312) the argument that high administrative costs
justify a bright-line rule is not a strong one. For a discussion of the problems
inherent in valuation and a suggestion that markets may be useful for valuing
incommensurables, see Neil Duxbuy, Law, Markets and Valuation, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 657 (1995).
1 See, eg., Symposium, supra note 174; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at
9-24 (discussing criticisms of the theory). In brief, the point which is frequently
made is that since a purely positive theory of tort law lacks any normative or pro-
scriptive component, it cannot itself form the basis for a normative theory of tort
law. The inference is that tort law requires a normative component; this inference
is made on the basis of the subsuming of some principle or policy in tort law. See,
e.g., George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1972) (arguing that tort law embeds corrective justice principles).
The authors suggest that the validity of their approach is independent of
normative concerns. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 173, at 9, 255 n.62. This asser-
tion has also been challenged on two grounds. First, the theoretical suppositions
that the positive theory promulgates are not verifiable. See Gregory S. Crespi, The
Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Confronting the Problemns of
Nonfailsifiability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 231, 238 (1991)
(arguing that law and economics scholarship is not subject to accepted scientific
analysis). Second, the theory's validity also depends in part on a finding that the
same concerns must have motivated courts to decide cases on an efficiency basis
in the 19th century. Rabin suggests that tort law was too riddled with contradic-
tions in the 19th century to support the theory that utility concerns alone guided
judicial decisionmaking. Rabin, supra note 27, at 950-52.
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native theory that would provide a basis for understanding tort
law. George Fletcher has articulated a concept of tort law as
mediating between individuals who take risks. Fletcher has
developed this concept in a series of articles in which he ar-
gues that tort law is best understood as the resolution of non-
reciprocal risk taking."7 In other words, "a victim has a right
to recover for injuries caused by a risk greater in degree and
different in order from those created by the victim and [im-
posed on] the defendant... ." Under his theory, the origi-
nal formulation of the test asked whether the party who ab-
sorbed the risk had agreed to do so; was there a reciprocity of
risk, and if not, could the risk be excused?0 9 Members of a
society were liable to each other only if they imposed unnatu-
ral risks upon each other; background or equivalent risk-taking
did not result in liability. 10 For example, two airplanes fly-
ing in the same area subject each other to reciprocal risks, but
there is no reciprocity of risk between the pilot of the plane
and a person on the ground.' Fletcher argues that recipro-
cal risk taking was displaced in the nineteenth century by the
concept of reasonableness. The question changed from "Did A
subject B to a nonreciprocal harm?" to "Was A's conduct rea-
sonable?"1 The adoption of the utilitarian method of
decisionmaking led to the abandonment of corrective justice
concerns, resulting in the individual "suffer[ing] other depri-
vations in the name of a utilitarian calculus" because the stan-
dard of liability was no longer tied to an act, but to a weighing
of social interests. 13 Fletcher makes clear that for him the
principle of corrective justice is the foundation of tort law, and
so individual rights must trump utilitarian concerns.214
To apply this theory to a negligently inflicted bystander
207 Fletcher, supra note 206; George P. Fletcher, The Search for Synthesis in
Tort Theory, 2 J. LAW & PHIL. 63 (1983). As with the law and economics move.
ment, there is a vast body of literature on this subject. This Note confines its
examination of this theory to its original form. For a thoughtful discussion which
is beyond the scope of this Note, see COLEMAN, supra note 171.
's Fletcher, supra note 206, at 542.
'9 Fletcher, supra note 206, at 542.
210 Fletcher, supra note 206, at 544-51.
211 Fletcher, supra note 206, at 542.
21 Fletcher, supra note 206, at 556-57.
213 Fletcher, supra note 206, at 568.
214 Fletcher, supra note 207, at 80.
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emotional distress claim we must consider the assumptions
that Fletcher makes. He states that the application of the
corrective justice principle as applied through the "paradigm of
reciprocity" requires both the availability of excuse defenses to
liability, and the superiority of a corrective justice (i.e., individ-
ual) claim over a utilitarian concern.215 Furthermore, the
proper starting point for the analysis should be a consideration
of the risk rather than the harm (ex ante rather than ex
post).216
Although in the case of Darlene Trombetta, ex ante risk
analysis provides an answer to the question of liability,
Fletcher's theory does not provide criteria for ordering risks
that are not clearly nonreciprocal. Beyond his plane crash
examples, Fletcher does not indicate what precisely distin-
guishes a reciprocal from a nonreciprocal risk.2 7 In Darlene's
case, both the plaintiff and the defendant were engaging in
every-day background activities (crossing a street, driving a
truck). Assuming that the act of driving the truck exposed
Darlene to a greater risk than her crossing of the street did to
the truck driver, her claim could still be resisted on the
grounds that she assumed some risk in crossing the street. As
Fletcher admits, since in the absence of a prior express waiver
the determination of Darlene's risk-taking could be determined
only on an ex post basis, this analysis collapses into a contrib-
utory/comparative negligence analysis.2 8 Here, since the
driver exposed the aunt-and by extension Darlene-to a
clearly nonreciprocal risk, it is likely that under Fletcher's
21 Fletcher, supra note 207, at 80.
21 Fletcher, supra note 207, at 8L
217 Fletcher suggests that the doctrine of proximate cause could be invoked to
establish reciprocity;, if the plaintiffs risk-taking was not the legal cause of the
accident, then there was no reciprocal risk-taking, and the defendant should be
liable. Fletcher, supra note 207, at 85. Although proximate caure does limit the
scope of liability, it is not a device for balancing reciprocity of risk; it limits liabil-
ity by requiring that an act be the legal cause of an accident. Defining a risk as
not the proximate cause of an accident merely removes that risk-taking conduct
from the lawsuit; it fails to provide any guide as to the reciprocity of the risk.
Further, by failing to consider the potential for harm in risk.taking conduct unless
it causes an injury, Fletcher's position requires that all analysis be performed on
an ex post basis, since a risk that is not the proximate cause of a harm cannot be
counted as a reciprocal risk. See also Fletcher, supra note 206, at 572 (defining
reciprocity as a search for a metaphor for the 'unifying features" of activities).
2' Fletcher, supra note 207, at 85-86.
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system Darlene could bring a successful action. Once we move
beyond the realm of the clearly nonreciprocal risk, however,
the failure of Fletcher's theory to provide adequate distinctions
where the respective risks are not so clearly delineated pre-
vents it from providing any guidance for resolving many negli-
gently inflicted bystander emotional distress claims.
More importantly, Fletcher's emphasis on the acts of the
individual fails to provide any meaningful constraint on liabili-
ty. Like Landes and Posner, Fletcher's emphasis on a single
principle generates unacceptable results.219 First, under his
doctrine, parties are free actors and so may assume any risk
by waiving their rights. In allowing an actor to waive an enti-
tlement protected by a liability rule, Fletcher is thus impliedly
asserting that all choices are equal and hence bereft of any
other concerns.22 ° Second, the rejection of a utilitarian factor
in the mix of liability concerns raises definitional questions as
to the scope of tort liability. Although Fletcher's scheme recog-
nizes that it may be necessary to continue socially useful
nonreciprocal-risk behavior, his scheme would require compen-
sation for all those affected.221 In the absence of any mean-
ingful criteria for determining reciprocity, the ramifications of
this position are troubling. In short, in his drive to provide a
unifying theory that asserts the primacy of the individual,
Fletcher fails to adduce any meaningful constraints. His em-
phasis on the explication of corrective justice through the para-
digm of reciprocity restores the concerns of the individual that
Landes and Posner have eliminated, but fails to provide any
guidance for the development of a normative theory based
upon the tension between the needs of society and the individ-
ual.22
2
219 See Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern
American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27 (1980), reprinted in TORT LAW 41-83
(Ernest J. Weinrib ed., 1991).
o KELMAN, supra note 84, at 127-28.
2' Fletcher, supra note 206, at 550.
Englard believes that the bulk of American writing on tort (until 1980) is an
attempt to create a formalistic theory of tort law. He places Posner (among others)
in the functionalist group, which he defines as a group of writers who argue for
pure economic efficiency, and labels writers like Fletcher traditionalists because
they accept the traditional framework of the common law. He asserts that all of
these writers are formalists in that all of their systems purport to be "self-con.
tained, apolitical, and logical." Englard, supra note 219, at 31-32.
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3. Balancing the Interests
Any negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress
standard must consider the competing concerns surrounding
the tort. As previously noted, these concerns are the fear of
unlimited liability and related arguments contrasted with the
need to address the harm that befalls an emotionally injured
bystander. The key to resolving this conflict is twofold: first,
balance the interests in a manner that will satisfy the concerns
of both camps, and second, construct a framework for negli-
gently inflicted bystander emotional distress that draws upon
already existing principles that are appropriate to the claim.
It can be argued that if a negligently inflicted bystander
emotional distress action is permitted, then no limit should be
placed on it.' Indeed, courts often use this argument to de-
ny any recovery, on the theory that the scope of a negligently
inflicted bystander emotional distress action has no principled
limit. In New York, these fears have induced the court of
appeals to circumscribe the class of potential plaintiffs so as to
exclude all but a handful.' s Yet even commentators and
courts that do advocate relaxing the rules to allow for a broad-
er class of plaintiffs acknowledge the need to place some limit
upon the size of any potential class of claimants. These
writers agree that without some limitation on the group of
potential claimants the possibility for limitless litigation is
Embracing formalism, Ernest Weinrib suggests that the formalism of private
law concepts is irreconcilable with instrumentalist goals since these goals are ap-
plied to tort law rather than derived from it, so that "[i]nstead of being an intelli-
gible normative phenomenon, tort law becomes a battleground of mutually limiting
justifications." Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV.
485, 525 (1989), reprinted in TORT LAW (Ernest J. Weinr-b ed., 1991).
See Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic
Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333 (1984).
' See Trombetta v. Conkling, 82 N.Y.2d 549, 626 NE.2d 653, 605 N.Y.S.2d
678 (1993).
' See id. at 554, 626 N..2d at 655, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 680 (defining the class of
potential plaintiffs as "discrete [and] readily determinable").
' See Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 377 (N.J. 1994) (noting that in the
context of expanding recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress to a wom-
an who witnessed the death of her fianc6 in an auto accident the problem of lim-
itless liability is avoided"); see also Mller, supra note 39 (arguing that while lia-
bility be unrestricted, damages be limited to economic loss).
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present. If these concerns justify a limitation on recovery, it is
important to examine their source so that the adopted limits
reflect valid concerns.
Corrective justice and utility concerns inform the need for
a limit on liability. Corrective justice suggests a limit on lia-
bility because it insists upon fairness for both plaintiff and
defendant.2" Fairness concerns center on the concept of pro-
portionality. As one commentator notes, "The Anglo-American
judicial tradition maintains a deep abhorrence to the notion of
disproportionate penalties for wrongful behavior."' Thus it
is not that courts are unwilling to impose unlimited liability;
rather, they are unwilling to impose disproportionate liability,
and thereby "offend[ ] the sense of justice."2  This concern
informs tort law in both duty and proximate cause. Proximate
cause restricts the consequences of an act, while duty restricts
the scope of obligations by requiring a sufficient nexus (itself
comprised of relational and foreseeable elements) between
plaintiff and defendant to justify imposing liability.23 In both
cases, courts restrict liability to prevent imposition of an obli-
gation when the relationship between the victim and the
wrongdoer is too attenuated.231 Fairness concerns are also
apparent in the threshold requirement for wrongdoing, requir-
Fletcher, supra note 206, at 547 n.40 ("Using the tort system to redistribute
negative wealth (accident losses) violates the premise of corrective justice, namely
that liability should turn on what the defendant has done, rather than on who he
is.").
Aristotle posited the function of corrective justice as an effort to redress the
imbalance between parties where one has suffered an injury at the hands of an-
other:
[Where] the suffering and the action have been unequally distributed ...
the judge tries to equalize things by means of the penalty, taking away
from the gain of the assailant. For the term 'gain' is applied generally to
such cases even if it be not a term appropriate to certain cases ....
THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARIsToTLE 1786-87 (1132(a)(8) Jonathan Barnes ed. &
WD. Ross trans., 1984).
2 Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A
Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1534 (1985) (citing the constitutional prohi-
bition against "cruel and unusual punishment"). See also Fletcher, supra note 206
(arguing that tort law imposes a penalty only for nonreciprocal risk creation).
22 OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMiON LAW 96 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963).
This theme is present in the New York decisions, as evinced by the court's use of
"crushing" when discussing the imposition of liability. See, e.g., Pulka v. Edelman,
40 N.Y.2d 781, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 390 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1976).




ing a showing that the injury complained of is both the product
of the defendant's act and that it is more than mere "back-
ground harm[ ],232 preventing spurious or minor claims, his-
torically a concern in the negligently inflicted bystander emo-
tional distress context.
Several utilitarian concerns also point toward a limit on
liability. First, because society has not banned the activities
that cause emotional distress, freedom from emotional distress
is protected by liability rules rather than property or inalien-
ability rules.2 " The interest may be protected, but since an
actor "may destroy the initial entitlement [here, the interest in
emotional stability] if he is willing to pay an objectively deter-
mined value for it" such an interest is not an absolute
right.' Since society has not seen fit to establish a rule that
would prohibit the involuntary transfer of this entitlement, it
follows that there must be a limit on the level of compensation
for the transfer.
Id. at 166; see also Givelber, supra note 39.
Calabresi & Mfelamed, supra note 44, at 33. The nature of the interest can
be determined by the type of protection; property rights and inalienability rules
are enforced through ex ante measures such as injunctions, while liability
entitlements are protected by ex post actions which correct for the transfer.
I Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 44, at 33. The lack of an absolute bar on
causing mental distress reflects a balance the society has made. In essence, it has
determined that for a variety of reasons, we are willing to allow a certain amount
of emotional distress in return for some of the benefits that modern society offers.
See CALABRESI, supra note 167, at 19 ("In accident law too, the decision to take
lives in exchange for money or convenience is sometimes made politically or collec-
tively without a balancing of the money value of the lives taken against the mon-
ey price of the convenience, and sometimes made through the market on the basis
of such a value.").
2" Under Calabresi and Melamed's theory, the hallmark of an entitlement pro-
tected by a liability rule is that the valuation of the entitlement is arrived at
objectively. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 44, at 33. This corresponds with the
function of traditional tort law, which allows a cross section of society as repre-
sented in the jury to arrive at an objective evaluation of the value of the entitle-
ment.
A negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress liability determination
might be thought of as limning the boundary between private spheres which con-
tain private rights and public spheres-policy decisionz-because it touches on both
the scope of protection afforded to private associational decisions and public liabili-
ty concerns. Louis M Seidman suggests that the location of a decision in the pri-
vate or public sphere is a consequence of the type of decision to be made. Louis
M. Seidman, Confusion at the Border: Crazan, -The Right to Die," and the Pub-
liclPrivate Distinction, in THE SUPREIE COURT REVIEW 1991 59-60 (1992). Argu-
ably, since decisions to associate and raise children have historically been located
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The efficiency argument runs this way: limitless liability
would destabilize the economy since actors who might incur
this liability could not protect against it. 236 Thus in Tobin,
the court stated that insurance alone could not cover the losses
that it perceived would flow from allowing liability claims:
"IT]he aggregate recoveries in a single accident.., are not
likely to stay within ordinary, let alone, compulsory insurance
liability limits. ,2 37 Likewise, "[m]anufacturers... may be
presumed to engage in cost-benefit analysis that quite explicit-
ly take into account the immediate risks to potential personal
injury victims.... [b]y contrast, the problem of widespread
economic loss is all-pervasive."2 ' At the other end of the lia-
bility spectrum, these concerns also provide a justification for
the necessity of showing harm so as to block meritless litiga-
tion.2' Together, these concerns-economic efficiency, fair-
ness, the limits of corrective justice, and the need to establish
a threshold for liability-indicate that the action must have
both upper and lower boundaries if it is to achieve a balance
between interests.
in the private sphere (see, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)), the determination of the scope of liability should be pro.
mised at least in part on the recognition that these concerns are linked to private
decisionmaking, and so should not be unreasonably circumscribed by a utilitarian
calculus alone.
See Rabin, supra note 27, at 951.
7 Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 617, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d
554, 559-60 (1969).
z Rabin, supra note 228, at 1533.
2' Frivolous litigation claims may be seen as unfair to the defendant, see supra
text accompanying notes 228-31, wasteful of system resources, see supra text ac-
companying notes at notes 199-200, or as a type of claim, rather than a kind of
harm, that is not susceptible of redress by the legal system. Because consideration
of the implications of this last claim is beyond the scope of this Note, this Note
takes as its starting point the argument that society as currently constituted per-
mits a certain level of background harm. Givelber, supra note 39.
In general, the level of injury that a party must show should be analogized to
the types of injury that a victim must show to maintain an action. See Battalla v.
State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.,.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (discussing types of
evidence that would be acceptable to show emotional injury); see also Miller, supra
note 39 (arguing that since damages should be limited to economic losses the only
proof that need be shown is evidence of economic loss).
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IV. DEVELOPING A FRAII.WORK
A. Organizing Principles
As previously indicated, since one of the enduring prob-
lems with existing negligently inflicted bystander emotional
distress rules is the lack of fit that results from borrowing
inapposite rules, it is imperative that any principles imported
to construct a framework for this tort bear a relationship to
the interests that must be balanced and provide a standard
that courts can adopt with a minimum of difficulty. In devel-
oping this framework, we should look to see if any spade work
has already been performed, i.e. turn to an area of the law that
has already wrestled with the difficulties inherent in determin-
ing the rights of parties in a world of complex and fluid rela-
tionships: ° family law.
At first glance, it might seem that family law would not be
a useful source."' After all, family law governs relations be-
tween individuals,' while tort law addresses injury. Tort
and family law do not share the same structure, nor a fully
coextensive set of principles and policies. Nevertheless, family
and tort law share points of intersection that can provide in-
sights into mediating the negligently inflicted bystander emo-
tional distress conflict.
First, it should be noted that family law is not a stranger
24 The increased complexity and interdependence of modem society renders
legal analysis based upon a concept of community that presupposes clear lines of
membership, relatively little overlapping, and a fair degree of uniformity in the
activities carried on, exceedingly difficult in many cases ... " Fletcher, supra
note 206, at 549 n.46.
241 Although it might appear that in "borrowing" from family law this Note
advocates an approach rooted in 'legal pragmatism" this approach is pragmatic
only insofar as it is an attempt to suggest a solution to a perceived problem and
is not an express embrace of any particular variant of "legal pragmatism." For an
introduction to legal pragmatism, see PRAGMIA7ISI IN LAW AND SoCmTI'r M Brint
& W. Weaver eds., 1991).
242 Martha Minow has defined family law as 9ncludtingl the terrain where legal
norms and social experiences of family interact( ]" and '[flamilies themselves ...
initially to embrace social units created by biological andfor affective ties among
people who commonly contribute[ ] to one another's economic, moral, and psycho-
logical well-being." Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that Grows".
Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819, 825 (citations omitted).
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to tort law: consortium is only the most obvious tort predicated
on status conferred by family law. Second, family law itself has
changed in a manner that suggests further rapprochement
with tort law. Since the 1960s, family law has become increas-
ingly "privatized."2 " Claims within family law increasingly
center on the rights of individuals within relationships; mar-
riage, for example, has come to be seen as less of an economic
partnership and more of a means to self fulfillment, with a
consequent loosening of the restrictions upon entering and
leaving it.' Although the rights-based approach has been
criticized for facilitating the weakening of the family as a buff-
er between the state and the individual, 5 this approach can
provide important insights into the resolution of the negligent-
ly inflicted bystander emotional distress dilemma precisely
because it considers the value of relationships between indi-
viduals rather than relying on traditional status-based anal-
ysis. The jurisprudential methodology developed to generate
rights ordering in the unwed fathers' rights cases" can be
used in a relational context to generate a negligently inflicted
bystander emotional distress framework. Finally, the function-
al-family approach, which determines the degree of protection
accorded a relationship based on an appraisal of whether the
relationship functions in the same fashion to promulgate val-
ues in traditional family arrangements, can serve as the theo-
retical template for a negligently inflicted bystander emotional
distress framework because, as previously noted, the injury is
a function of the relationship.247 Because the function-
al-family analysis tracks the substance rather than the status
of the relationship, the methodology developed in these cases
243 See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989); Jana P. Singer,
The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443.
244 GLENDON, supra note 243, at 298-311; LASCH, supra note 47; Martha Minow,
We, the Family: Constitutional Rights and American Families, 74 J. AM. HIST. 959
(1987); Singer, supra note 243, at 1508-67.
26 See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 243, at 298-311. For a criticism of the rights-
based approach and a suggested alternative based on relational concerns, see MAR-
THA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN
LAW (1990).
" See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (citing Lehr v. Rob-
ertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
2 See supra text at notes 34-39.
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has specific usefulness for negligently inflicted bystander emo-
tional distress in shaping both the scope of the tort and its
underlying policy concerns.
As previously noted, the New York Court of Appeals has
made use of the functional-family approach in a variety of
contexts. In a series of zoning cases the court held that a group
of unrelated individuals should be considered family for pur-
poses of the statute where they live together in a fashion so as
to form "the functional equivalent of a family."48 In Braschi
v. Stahl Associates Co." 9 the court construed a rent-control
statute as including as family a person whose relationship
with the protected tenant was functionally the equivalent of a
traditional family.' Most recently, in In re Jacob, the
court held that the state's adoption statute did not preclude a
child's adoption by the unmarried partner of the biological
parent, finding that allowing those "who actually function as a
child's parents" to adopt accorded with statutory policy.5 2
While these decisions indicate that the court is not averse
to applying the functional-family concept in certain contexts,
it has refused to do so in others, most notably in Trombetta.
The court also refused to apply the functional-family test in
another adoption case, Alison D. v. Virginia M.' In that
case, the court refused to find that a homosexual former part-
ner of a biological parent could be considered a parent for pur-
poses of visitation rights.'
Reconciliation of these cases suggests the court used the
functional-family analysis whenever the question presented
concerned the rights of a family unit versus third parties. In
I' Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning, 45 N.Y.Xd 266,
274, 380 N.E.2d 207, 211, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377, 381 (1978); cee cupra note 162 (citing
cases).
74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2cl 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989) (applying functional-
family test to determine if a live-in companion qualifies as family member under
rent-control statute).
2 In its decision, the court noted that the definition it adopted was "completely
unrelated" to the analysis in the zoning cases. Id. at 212 n.3, 543 NSE.2d at 54
n.3, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789 n.3. Nevertheless, the actual test adopted is one that
gives protection under the statute to any household 'having all of the normal
familial characteristics." Id. at 211, 543 NY.2d at 54, 544 N.YS.2d at 789.
86 N.Y.2d 651, 660 NYE.2d 397, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1995).
I&. at 658, 660 NY..2d at 399, 636 N.YS.2d at 718.
77 N.Y.2a 651, 572 N.,.2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991) (per curiam).
- Id. at 657, 572 NE.2d at 29, 569 N.Y.S.2a at 588.
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Braschi, the court employed a functional-family type analysis
to give greater protection to the relationship.255 Likewise, in
the zoning cases, the court gave protection to groups that acted
as a family unit,25 6 and in In re Jacob the court acted to
strengthen the family unit by allowing an adoption.257 In
contrast, the court refused to grant visitation rights where this
right would curtail the right of the biological parent.25 8 The
functional-family test, then, is applied when its application
would preserve or further a familial unit, but not when its
application will infringe existing relational rights, or otherwise
delegitimate the status of existing relationships.25 So long as
there is no conflict with a preexisting right the court will rec-
ognize the interest.
This analysis might reasonably be contested on the ground
that the cases adopting the functional-family analysis were
cases that construed statutes, and so bear no relationship to
each other.26 ° While it is beyond debate that the immediate
' Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 211, 548 N.E.2d 49, 53-54, 544
N.Y.S.2d 784, 789 (1989).
See infra note 262.
"[Plermitting the adoptions allows the children to achieve a measure of per-
manency with both parent figures ... ." In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 659, 660
N.E.2d 397, 399, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716, 718 (1995).
' Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 656, 572 N.E.2d 27, 29, 569
N.Y.S.2d 586, 588 (1991).
"' This argument suggests that if individuals can achieve the same benefits
through an informal act as they can through a formal act such as marriage, then
the status of the institution will diminish. See Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d at 669, 660
N.E.2d at 406, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 725 (arguing that court should not endow "at will"
relationships with benefits conferred by formal legal status) (Bellacosa, J., dissent-
ing).
This argument assumes that we enter into marriages because we will obtain
protection for this type of harm. Leaving aside the question of relationships not
currently given state-backed status, such as same-sex relationships, this argument
is flawed for two reasons. First, negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress
is not a substitute for consortium. See supra note 37. Second, the structure of the
current rule--recovery only to those in the zone of danger-is a test based on
physical proximity rather than relationship. The addition of the physical proximity
requirement does nothing to further the policy of marriage unless we believe that
spouses will always be in the same zone of danger. Finally, this argu.
ment-assuming that preventing unmarried cohabitants from recovering will pro-
mote marriage--misses the mark, for the argument for allowing recovery does not
rest on the status of marriage, but rather on the injury suffered as a result of the
plaintiffs relationship with the victim.
"o A related argument might be made that this reconciliation occurs at an
unjustifiably high level of abstraction, so that the reconciliation is unprincipled.
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issue at hand in each case was one of statutory construction,
the relevant question was "What is the purpose of the stat-
ute?"26' In each case that adopted a functional-family test,
the court construed the statute before it in a manner that fur-
thered legislative policy and, in doing so, found that a func-
tional-family analysis best furthered that purpose, where the
purpose was articulated as the furtherance of the values pres-
ent in the family.262
Two objections remain. First, the functional-family anal-
ysis has been applied only in the context of statutory inter-
pretation. This suggests that the court is unwilling to apply
the analysis in common law decisionmakng, perhaps because
it is comparatively easy to cabin its use in a statutory context.
Second, as noted above, the court has not used the analysis
when there is a conflict that could reduce the scope of an exist-
ing familial bond. Protection is extended to the unit, not the
individual. The court's refusal to adopt the functional-family
analysis to determine liability in a Trombetta-type situation,
(allowing it to define a truly "discrete" class of bystander plain-
tiffs), flows from the lack of a methodology to ascertain the
The problem with this argument is that it is an argument against coherence.
Thus, Justice Scalia's resort to the most specific level in the due process context
requires a finding of the most specific level; if one cannot be found, a higher level
of abstraction is used. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
Even if coherence is rejected as a value in a legal system, these cases may be
understood as individual examples of instrumental decisionmaing, here understood
as the promotion of families for the values they inculcate. See Mark Tushnst,
Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36
STAN. L. REV. 623 (1984).
261 "It is fundamental that in construing the words of a statute 'It]he legislative
intent is the great and controlling principle." Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 74 N.Y.2d
201, 207, 543 NYE.2d 49, 51, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 786 (1989) (citations omitted). See
HENRY AL HART, JR. & ALBERT AL SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MUAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 147 (William N. Esnridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., 1994) (in the process of interpreting a statute, an interpreter
"must do so in the way which best serves the principles and policies (the statute]
expressesd").
2'2 See, e.g., In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 659, 660 N.E.2d 397, 399, 636
N.Y.S.2 716, 718 (1995) (statutory purpose of promotion of child's best interests
furthered by use of functional-family analysis); Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 212, 543
N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789 (purpose of preventing dislocation furthered by
preserving "family units"); Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zon-
ing, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 274, 380 N.E.2d 207, 209-10, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377, 381 (1978)
(purpose of zoning statute is to further family values and recognition of group as
family will further this purpose).
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scope of rights of individuals within2 a nontraditional unit.
To resolve this dilemma, we must turn to the family law
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. While the
Supreme Court's decisions in the area of due process and fami-
ly rights are not made with the interests considered here in
mind, the Court's efforts to establish a framework to determine
the scope of individual rights in relation to other individuals
provide a method and rationale for setting a standard to devel-
op the rights of individuals in the-negligently inflicted bystand-
er emotional distress context, because in resolving these cases
the Court has had to establish a methodology for ordering
conflicting interests.2" Furthermore, in these decisions, the
Court has recognized the importance of emotional attachments:
"the constitutional shelter afforded such [personal] relation-
ships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of
their emotional enrichment from close ties with others."26
Moreover, this methodology accords protection only to those
interests deemed worthy of protection in other contexts.266
The most recent exposition of the Court's standard can be
found in Michael H. v. Gerald D.2 ' In that case, the Court
upheld a California statute that created an irrebuttable evi-
dentiary presumption that a child born to a married couple
23 This Note will not address the case of the true bystander, e.g., the total
stranger who witnesses an accident. Whether an individual who lacks any connec-
tion with the victim should recover damages based upon their perceptions of an
incident requires a consideration of a set of concerns distinct from those considered
here. First, the potential class of claimants is limitless. Second, since a true spec-
tator lacks any nexus with the victim, it can be argued that entertaining these
claims would require the abandonment of an objective standard of reasonableness
because each plaintiffs claim would have to be adjudicated in the context of their
own response. Finally, this Note argues that the rationale for extending liability is
premised upon the link between the victim and the plaintiff; the unrelated by-
stander by definition lacks any such relationship and so suffers no injury to an
affectational bond.
2 4 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion
holding that state evidentiary presumption evinced a determination to accord pri-
macy to father by marriage over biological father); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248 (1983) (greater due process protection-with consequent impingement on oth-
ers-will be given a father who has "played a substantial role in raising his child"
than to a mere biological father). Id. at 261-62 & nn.16-18; Minow, supra note
244; see also Note, Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARv. L. REV. 1156 (1980) (hereinafter "Developments").
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
26b See infra notes 269-73.
2 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
1456 [Vol. 61: 1399
BYSTANDER EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
living together was the product of the marriage.2" A man
who had had a sexual relationship with a married woman who
later had a child challenged the statute on due process
grounds. A blood test showed that he had a greater than nine-
ty-seven percent probability of being the father. Writing for the
plurality, Justice Scalia rejected the claim, noting that the ini-
tial question for the Court when confronted with an assertion
of a right of this order is to determine if the "asserted liberty
interest [is] rooted in history and tradition."2" He held that
the determination of whether an interest is in fact rooted in
tradition may be resolved by looking to "the most specific level
at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection
to, the asserted right can be identified." Here the Court
looked to the history of the evidentiary presumption, and con-
cluded that it established a tradition against awarding rights
to a biological father in this instance." Thus the initial
question in determining if protection should be afforded is
whether a societal tradition exists favoring the asserted right.
While at first glance it might seem odd to import this
methodology into the negligently inflicted bystander emotional
distress context, there are compelling reasons for its importa-
tion. In Michael H. the Court had to resolve competing claims,
both of which had merit, rather than simply expand the level
of protection to a person who had previously been denied it.
The context-conflict and a need to order claims-is akin to
the conflict New York courts face in debating the scope of legal
legitimacy for those in nontraditional units. Second, the plu-
rality suggests a rule that points to other indicia and so pre-
vents the creation of indeterminate and difficult to define
protections. Finally, the fact that the decision in Michael H. is
the product of a search for the relevant level of generality for
due process analysis is not a bar to its application; rather, it
Id. at 131-32.
I&. at 123. See also Developments, cupra note 264, at 1177 ("In the family
cases, the Court has consistently turned to tradition as a rourco of previously
unrecognized aspects of the liberty protected by the due process clauses.").
7 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989).
zn Id. at 129 n.7 ("[Wie rest our decision not upon our independent 'balancing'
of such interests, but upon the absence of any constitutionally protected right to
legal parentage on the part of an adulterous natural father in Michael's situation,
as evidenced by long tradition. That tradition represents a 'balancing' test that has
already been made by society itself").
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provides an additional reason for the importation of its ap-
proach. In Michael H., the Court's mission was to define the
amount of protection that an interest should have. The plurali-
ty did so not by creating a new right, but rather by applying a
methodology that looked to existing rules to ascertain if the
interest asserted had support elsewhere in the law. This ap-
proach suits the negligently inflicted bystander emotional dis-
tress context admirably. In determining whether an interest
has been injured, the project is not creating a new right, but
rather looking at whether the interest affected is protected in
other contexts for the same reason; that is, if it is protected in
other contexts in order to further values that are similar to
those protected by negligently inflicted bystander emotional
distress claims, then it should be protected in the negligently
inflicted bystander emotional distress context as well. The
premises driving the methodology in Michael H.-the need to
prioritize, limn, and define a right based on the degree of pro-
tection received in other contexts-are strikingly similar to the
need in the negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress
context to protect and limit the protection of the interest with
reference to existing standards.27
'" Justice Scalia's approach in Michael H. has not escaped criticism. Most of
this criticism revolves around two issues. First, the requirement of the most specif-
ic level at which the tradition operates is a cramped view that fails to consider
changes in American mores. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 136.
57 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tribe & Dorf, supra note 16. In response, it
should initially be noted that in the tort context the concerns are not coextensive
with the due process concerns implicated by this decision. Second, as noted below,
a functional-family analysis must take into account changing mords. See infra note
273. This Note adopts Justice Scalia's approach for two reasons. First, it is the
most restrictive, and so provides the greatest level of restraint on the number of
potential plaintiffs. Second, it opts for a relatively straightforward methodology,
which answers the objection that any negligently inflicted bystander emotional dis-
tress formula is hopelessly vague.
Two further objections can be made. First, the method is overly mechanical.
This objection is not applicable in the negligently inflicted bystander emotional
distress context. A judge applying this method would have to ascertain not only if
relevant traditions existed, but whether these traditions provide protection for the
same reasons-to further the values that we associate with negligently inflicted
bystander emotional distress interests. Absent this symmetry, there is no reason to
provide protection. The second objection-that this methodology is inherently re-
strictive (read conservative) because it is backward rather than forward looking-is
correct, but misplaced. It must be emphasized that the intent here is not to create
a new right, but rather to protect existing interests which are not currently recog-
nized in the bystander context. The assumption here is that if it is protected else-
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Tradition alone cannot provide the sole criteria for deter-
mining the scope of individual rights; at a minimum, tradition
must be interpreted in a fashion consonant with the values
that underlie the historic protection.' The limits of an ap-
proach that limits itself to a consideration of whether the ac-
tion is historically favored is evident in its application of negli-
gently inflicted bystander emotional distress claims. Histori-
cally, negligently inflicted emotional distress actions have been
limited not because of a tradition of societal disapproval, but
because of fears of widespread liability and fraud 4 Thus
New York courts have denied recovery even as they have found
that the harm is legitimate.' Commentators have argued
that when considering the scope of due process rights that
should be accorded to a family unit, the Supreme Court has
made its determinations on the basis of whether the unit un-
der scrutiny operates to preserve the same values that a tradi-
tional family doesY If the Court finds that the values it has
where, then it can be protected in this context.
A further objection may be made on the basis that the rule is content censi-
tive because a judge may opt for a particular level of generality to ascertain if a
relevant tradition exists. While the jurisprudential concerns implicated by this
argument are beyond the scope of this Note, it may be observed that this concern
is less pressing in this context since determining whether an otherwise recognized
interest should be protected by a liability rule is a different operation than wheth-
er an interest should be recognized in any context. Like the argument as to the
relevant level of generality in the elaboration of rights, this argument is beyond
the scope of this Note. For a discussion as to the appropriate level of generality to
select, see Tribe & Dorf, supra note 16, and Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction
and Authority, 59 U. CIu. L. REV. 349 (1992).
M Aoore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977); see also Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 US. 816, 842-45
(1977) (discussing definition of "family" and finding that it may be other than
biological). In the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia seemed to note the need for
flexible analysis, noting that his analysis could lead to a different result given a
different set of facts: "We limit our pronouncement to the relevant facts of this
case because it is at least possible that our traditions lead to a different conclu-
sion [where there is no conflict between the parties].* fWael H., 491 US. at 129
n.7. Precisely what constitutes a family for decisional purposes is left open; the
decision expressly limits itself to finding that a due process interest is not exhib-
ited in this case. Id. at 123 n.3.
See cliece, supra note 17.
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 617, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d
554, 560 (1969) (refusing to allow recovery for an emotional distress claim on the
part of a mother whose son was iWured but noting, 'Every parent who loses a
child or whose child of any age suffers an injury is likely to sustain grievous
psychological trauma, with the added risk of consequential physical harm.).
276 Developments, supra note 264 at 1177-87. Martha Minow suggests that the
1995] 1459
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
historically protected are present, then the Court affords the
group protection, regardless of its formal status. 7 Because
negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress also operates
to protect the same values, the same approach--coupling tradi-
tional values with a functional approach27 --can be used to
determine the scope of liability in a negligently inflicted by-
stander emotional distress action.
This approach accords protection to a relationship when-
ever the relationship operates to protect the same traditions
that serve as the justification for the protection of other rela-
tionships.279 This approach not only seeks to preserve core
values traditionally protected, but also gives a court more flexi-
bility to fashion substantive rules, since the application of a
content-based standard rests upon the values that deserve
protection rather than the legal status of the parties.
B. Application
1. Negligently Inflicted Bystander Emotional Distress
as a Historically Protected Interest
The threshold question under the plurality's theory articu-
lated in Michael H. is whether society has demonstrated a
desire to protect the interest.2" The hodgepodge of rules de-
veloped over the years indicates that society does value the
protection of emotional well-being, even if it cannot come to a
clear consensus as to what the scope of that rule should be.
The elimination of the requirement of physical impact for a
direct emotional injury such as fright demonstrates that soci-
ety values the protection of emotional well-being sufficiently
highly as to allow an action that lacks a physical injury.281
Similarly, society has demonstrated a willingness to pro-
approach adopted in the family law cases is a rights approach cloaked in the
rhetoric of tradition. Minow, supra note 244.
27 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977).
2 Developments, supra note 264, at 1182. Cf MINOW, supra note 245 (advoca.
ting a relational rather than pure rights-based approach).
7 Developments, supra note 264, at 1182.
0 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 n.7 (1989).
' See Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1961) (eliminating requirement of physical impact in claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress).
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tect the emotional interests of the indirectly affected. The earli-
est examples of this protection are found in the cases that
allow recovery for the negligent mishandling of a corpse, or a
message regarding the death of a loved one.' Although it
has been argued that the negligent party owed a duty to the
person who received the message or who witnessed the mis-
handling, and that the liability springs from the creation of
that duty,' the better explanation for liability where the
plaintiff is a bystander is the relationship between the de-
ceased and the plaintiff.' Since no tort duty to bystanders
exists in the absence of a relationship, the existence of a
relationship provides the criterion for establishing liability.
Other rules such as the zone of danger rule and the Dillon
foreseeability test also indicate that an emotional interest is
protected by negligent infliction claims; the debate has cen-
tered on the scope of liability rather than the validity of the
claim. While each rule limits the class of persons who may
recover, none is an absolute bar, thus demonstrating society's
determination to protect that interest as well as rooting it in
tradition.
In Michael H., Justice Scalia found that the best method
to determine the appropriate level of protection for a right was
to place that right at the "most specific level" at which it could
2 2 See Speigel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 186 A. 585, 688 (N.J. 1936) (liability
for emotional distress imposed where cemetery firm did not bury father with fami-
ly members present as per agreement); Gosthokowski v. Roman Catholic Church of
Sacred Hearts of Jesus & Mary, 232 N.Y. 320, 186 N.E. 798 (1933) (damages
awarded for disinterring of wife's corpse and reburial in another plot without per-
mission); see also W. PAGE KEETON L'r AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAI OF
TORTS 63 nn.81-88 (5th ed. 1984) (collecting cases); see also Green, cupra note 15,
at 489.
' Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 334 N.E.2d 590 (1975)
(liability imposed where hospital negligently informed daughter that mother had
died, court found duty running to daughter).
I See Speigel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 186 A. 585, 588 (N.J. 1936) (holding
that the defendant's failure to bury father in accord with instructions 'was a
wrongful invasion of plaintiffs' relative rights springing from the civil and domestic
relations. It was a 'legally protected interest' of the plaintiffs, the tortious invasion
of which is actionable and makes the actor liable for mental or emotional dis-
tress.").
" Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 383, 334 N.E.2d 590, 593, 372 N.Y.S.2d
638, 643 (1975). While the court distinguished Tobin on the ground that the injury




be asserted.2 6 Since the tradition of support for this claim
exists, the next defining act must be the establishment of the
most specific level. For negligently inflicted bystander emo-
tional distress, the most specific level must be within the con-
text of the family, functionally defined. Case law demonstrates
that when recovery is permitted under less restrictive circum-
stances, the requirement of a relationship with the victim
remains.287 This relationship must be substantial; it cannot
be mere acquaintance.2  Parties who can claim injury are
those who stand in the position of family member.2" There-
fore, the scope of the right asserted (the ability to maintain an
action for negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress)
should be limited to those who stand in the position of family
member.
The threshold question for determining family membership
should be based upon a functional analysis rather than a rule-
bound application; the family is afforded protection because of
its function, not its status.290 Because the family is the repos-
itory of so many fundamental values, the role that individuals
play in the family is important, not their formal
relationship. 291 Defining the family in functional terms has
Michael IH. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 n.7 (1989).
7 This requirement is shown in the third prong of the Dillon rule, as modified
by Elden and La Chusa, so that only parties who can show a specific relationship
with the victim can recover. See supra note 93. States that have adopted the
Dillon test have also kept this requirement. See, e.g., Champion v. Grey, 478 So.
2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1985) (requiring "an especially close emotional attachment to the
directly injured person"). Generally, when the state has clung to a more restrictive
rule, such as the zone of danger rule, the importance of the familial relationship
is less (indeed, under a pure zone of danger rule, a stranger could recover); but
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (Reporter's Notes 1963) (no recovery
for emotional distress resulting from harm to another for those who are unrelated
to the victim).
s Champion, 478 So. 2d at 20.
See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 845 n.53 (1977) ("the legal status of families has never been regarded as
controlling [for due process purposes]").
"Id. As Justice Harlan has noted:
Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from the
sanctity of property rights. The home derives its pre-eminence as the
seat of family life. And the integrity of that life is something so funda-
mental that it has been found to draw to its protection the principles of
more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2" See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977); Jimenez v.
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other advantages as well. Because a functional-family defini-
tion restricts the scope of liability in a manner that does not
rely on the use of any other category such as gender, it avoids
injustice.2 Additionally, it recognizes that many American
families no longer resemble two parent households. 3 A func-
tional approach that builds upon the traditions recognized in
the common law gives courts the flexibility they need to decide
cases in a fluid society based upon a clear and easily definable
premise: so long as the actor functions in a manner consistent
with a member of a traditional household, that person will fall
within the ambit of the rule.
C. Fashioning a Remedy
Since a functional family relationship that preserves tradi-
tionally protected values also demonstrates the presence of an
affectational bond, protecting such a relationship suggests the
scope of the remedy. Only those who have a relationship that
furthers values synonymous with those that provide the ratio-
nale for originally according protection to the family should be
able to maintain an action. Darlene Trombetta, who had a
mother-daughter relationship with her aunt, or a same-sex
couple raising children could maintain an action, but parties to
an incestuous relationship could not: only the first two exam-
ples further values thought important. While this test resolves
the threshold issue of establishing a class of potential plain-
tiffs, it does not address the question of which of these plain-
tiffs have suffered a cognizable harm. Not every person who
meets the threshold relational criteria necessarily should be
able to recover for negligently inflicted bystander emotional
distress if they did not actually suffer emotional distress as a
result of the injury to the victim. The answer to this problem
lies in the application of traditional tort principles, because the
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1973) (denial of food stamp benefits to unrelated mem-
bers of a household held denial of equal protection).
2'2 See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (striking down on equal pro-
tection grounds New York statute that barred the unwed father the right to block
an adoption).
13 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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traditional requirements of showing both a causal relationship
as well as damages allows for the use of time-tested principles
to be applied to this tort.
1. Causation
Recovery in negligence is predicated upon the violation of
a normative standard; that is, a wrong.2" Absent an act,
there is no recovery." In other words, in the negligently in-
flicted bystander emotional distress situation, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant's act that injured the victim did in
fact cause the emotional distress that the plaintiff suffered.
Usually the analysis will be straightforward; for example, in
Darlene Trombetta's case, the question of cause is not difficult
to resolve since she alleged that she suffered emotional dis-
tress as a result of witnessing her aunt's death. In other cases,
the doctrines of cause in fact and proximate cause provide a
suitable level of restriction to prevent spurious claims.
Assuming a relationship such that a duty exists, a court
might still find that the particular accident was unforeseeable,
or too removed causally to allow recovery. Causation doctrine
(cause in fact and proximate cause) has been invoked both as a
device for extending liability and as a device for limiting it,
depending upon the conduct at issue.296 The argument that
negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress recovery is
problematic because it is impossible to define the foreseeable
plaintiff has been asserted in New York.2" This argument,
based on the California experience, misses the point. The
threshold question is not foreseeability but duty.298 Foresee-
ability and proximate cause limit liability where a duty al-
ready exists. By using proximate cause to examine the causal
relationship between the defendant's act and the harm, rather
than to establish a class of plaintiffs, courts can use these
familiar doctrines to screen cases for the requisite causal con-
nection.
"s Weinrib, supra note 222, at 525.
COLEMAN, supra note 171, at 212 (footnote omitted).
6 See HART & HONORE, supra note 97, at 262-66.
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 617, 249 N3E.2d 419, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d
554, 560 (1969).
"' See supra notes 97-99.
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Two cases illustrate the advantages of this approach. In
Ochoa v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court
found that the mother of a child who had died as a result of
negligent treatment had stated a claim for negligently inflicted
bystander emotional distress under the Dillon formula even
though the harm she suffered came about over a period of
several days as her son's condition deteriorated. The court held
that she could recover even though there was no sudden acci-
dental occurrence."' In Kelly v. Kokua Sales and Supply
Ltd.,3 ' the Hawaii Supreme Court imposed a proximity limit
on negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress actions.
The court refused to allow liability where the grandfather
living in California died from shock upon receiving word that
his granddaughter had been killed in an auto accident in Ha-
waii. The court held that the defendant was not liable because
the plaintiff was not located a reasonable distance from the
scene.
302
In the case of Ms. Ochoa, the record indicates that she did
in fact function as the decedent's mother.3" In this case, she
would meet the threshold requirement as a potential plaintiff.
Application of traditional proximate cause doctrine would dem-
onstrate that her son's death was both the cause in fact and
the legal cause of her emotional injury." 4 So long as she
could prove the remaining elements of negligence she would be
able to maintain an action. In the case of Mr. Kelly, the an-
swer to the threshold question is not clear from the record,
however, it is unlikely that if he lived in California while his
daughter lived in Hawaii that they had a relationship that
currently furthered protected values.3's Absent such a show-
2" 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985).
I' &e. at 7.
501 532 P.2d 673 (Haw. 1975).
m Id. at 676.
SOchoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1985).
34Id.
s This case also illustrates the necessity of requiring a potential plaintiff to
show that the relationship which they claim functions as a family is current; oth-
erwise an estranged family could well recover, as could a blood relative who had
not seen her daughter in twenty years. In this situation, it is unlikely that the
person would suffer severe emotional distress since the affectational bond by defi-
nition is likely to be less strong. BOWLBY, supra note 34, at 103; Liobson, oupra
note 20, at 196.
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ing by the plaintiff, the plaintiff could not recover. Liability
determinations may be made in a fashion consonant with the
principles underlying the tort, rather than crudely limiting lia-
bility by deciding that Mr. Kelly is not reasonably located near
his daughter. This is a determination that bears no relation-
ship-other than an effort to limit liability-to the issue pre-
sented.
D. Damages
The other requirement is the traditional one of damages.
In order to ultimately collect damages, the plaintiff must prove
injury; absent a showing of harm there can be no recovery.
Like other torts, negligently inflicted bystander emotional
distress protects the invasion of a specific interest; it does not
protect against the slings and arrows of misfortune, sadness,
or loss. °6 Similarly, it is not an action for consortium, and so
the loss of a loved one will not, by itself, make out a claim for
negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress.3" Rather,
the loss must induce a shock and attendant manifestations of
emotional distress in the person who suffers it so that recovery
is justifiable. To make out a case for negligently inflicted by-
stander emotional distress, then, a claimant must show that
she or he has suffered emotional distress as a result of the
shock occasioned by a harm to the victim."' In 1961, the
court of appeals recognized that it was possible to prove emo-
3 This is nothing other than the recognized principle that absent the invasion
of a protected interest, there is no cognizable harm. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note
27, at 951; cf. HOLMES, supra note 229, at 110.
" This distinguishes the negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress ac-
tion from consortium; while a person could recover in a consortium action for the
loss of services even if they did not witness the injury to the spouse, they could
not recover for negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress unless they pled
and proved a cognizable emotional harm to themselves which flowed from their
perception of the injury to the victim. Thus a spouse might recover for consortium
but not negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress, while an unrelated care-
taker could recover for negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress alone.
"o See Liebson, supra note 20, at 195-201; Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress,
supra note 20, at 1256-62. The damages flow not from the shock itself, which is
evanescent, but from the trauma occasioned by the shock. "From a medical per-
spective, mental distress resulting from a negligent act can be characterized as a
reaction to a traumatic stimulus." Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note
20, at 1248 (citations omitted).
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tional distress to a jury without the need to show an im-
pact. °9 In evaluating the seriousness of emotional distress,
New York courts have the advantage of over thirty years of
determining the genuineness of an emotional distress claim, in
addition to any subsequent medical advances in the determina-
tion of distress from a response to psychic stimuli.3 1 0
Nevertheless, courts often assert the difficulty of proving
damages as a rationale for denying liability, despite the reality
that the devices for determining damages are at hand. Here
the damages question consists of two parts: establishing the
relationship and establishing the harm. Since emotional dis-
tress is manifest in the same form in both the victim and the
related bystander, techniques already in use for identifying
emotional distress in plaintiffs can be used with the same facil-
ity to discern the degree of harm a related bystander suffers.
In making a determination, two further questions must be
asked. Is this relationship one that operates to preserve tradi-
tionally protected values? Did it operate in this fashion in this
instance? The first question considers the function of the rela-
tionship; the second considers the specific evidence available to
consider the magnitude of the injury.
The functionality issue turns on the application of the
standard outlined above to limit liability. Plaintiffs would have
to demonstrate first that the relationship promoted values that
' 0 Battalla v. New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 242, 176 N.E2d 729, 731-32, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1961) (-In the difficult cases, vie must look to the quality and
genuineness of proofs and rely to an extent on the contemporary sophistication of
the medical profession and the ability of the court and jury to weed out the dis-
honest claims.").
31 Although the Trombetta court cited the fear of fabricated claim as one of
the rationales for denial of liability, the court did not offer any explanation to
distinguish the determination of a negligently inflicted emotional distress claim
from a negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress claim. The validity of the
distinction is dubious, for while the cause of the injury is different, the nature of
the injury may be the same.
This Note does not address the argument from incommensurability. Whatever
the merits of this argument, it has been implicitly rejected in this context through
the allowance of recovery for psychic harm absent a physical injury. Moreover,
since negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress is a tort bared upon an
injury to a person, rather than a recovery permitted on the basis of status, the
arguments advanced against extending consortium damages are not applicable
here. Cf. Borer v. American Airlines, 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977) (refusing to extend
consortium recovery to allow children to recover for injury to parent on policy and
incommensurability grounds); see generally Duxbury, oupra note 205.
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the Supreme Court has identified as worthy of protection.3"
This would require a showing at a low level of generality that
the identified values historically were protected, and that the
relationship at issue functioned to further these identified
values. For example, Darlene Trombetta could identify the
values protected in her relationship with her aunt as those
coextensive with a mother-daughter (or at a slightly higher
level of generality, parent-child) relationship. She would then
have to show that the relationship did indeed further these
values. So long as the claimant could show that the relation-
ship with the victim functioned in a manner that upheld tradi-
tionally protected values, this relationship would be recognized
for negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress purposes
regardless of its actual form. Since the form is secondary to
function, the claimant must also demonstrate that the rela-
tionship did actually promote these values.
Courts have often resisted negligently inflicted bystander
emotional distress claims on precisely this point, arguing that
any determination of liability would entangle them in a morass
of evidentiary problems. In fact, evidentiary standards already
exist to determine the validity of the claim. Since the stan-
dards for determining the emotional distress suffered are al-
ready available, the resolution of a claim turns on the evalua-
tion of the relationship. In defining evidentiary standards to
evaluate the relationship, New York can draw on the rules it
has already established in its functional-family and consortium
decisions.
These decisions provide a series of guidelines for estab-
lishing if a relationship was of a kind that is worthy of protec-
tion. Functional-family guidelines require that the parties
hold themselves out in a fashion that indicates a relationship,
demonstrate a measure of permanence, and fulfill a role that a
traditional unit would fulfill (e.g., spousal or parent-child).312
'1 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-05 & n.12
(1977). The values identified are in a sense functional, in that the protection ac-
corded the family (or similar associational groups) is based upon their function as
dominant societal value reproduction engines rather than as inculcators of specific
values. See id. at 503-04: "It is through the family that we inculcate and pass
down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural." (footnote omitted).
See generally LASCH, supra note 47.
"L In Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784
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Consortium rules provide additional standards by which to
determine the degree of harm suffered. Like negligently in-
flicted bystander emotional distress, the tort of consortium
attempts to provide a remedy for an intangible wrong.313 The
scope of the injury, and awards of consortium damages derive
from accepted negligence and evidentiary rules.314 The simi-
(1989), the court of appeals identified several factors to determine whether a ho-
mosexual couple could be considered a functional family for the purposes of New
York City's rent-control laws. The court stated the determination
should be based upon an objective examination of the relationship of the
parties. In making this assessment, [a court should look to] a number of
factors, including the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the
level of emotional and financial commitment the manner in which the
parties have conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to
society, and the reliance placed upon one another for daily family servic-
es.
Id. at 212-13, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790. See infra note 319; cce alro
James D. Esseks, Recent Developments, 25 HARV. CL-C.L. L. REV. 183 (1990).
Given the broad range of factors the Braschi court deemed useful for mking
a determination of familial status in this context, the argument that it would be
too difficult to ascertain the nature of the relationship in a negligently inflicted
bystander emotional distress case seems disingenuous. Considering the well-known
scarcity of rent-controlled apartments in Manhattan, it is unlikely that fraud is
less of a problem in the context of succession rights to low cost apartments in
New York than it would be in the context of negligently inflicted bystander emo-
tional distress claims. Finally, as previously noted, the court fails to provide a
rationale for the use of the functional-family or Braschi tests in some contexts but
not others. See supra notes 161-63. A court might well consider establishing a
different set of rules, but to argue that it is not possible to ascertain the nature
of the relationship is disingenuous given the tests already in use.
"' "The concept of consortium includes not only loss of support or services, it
also embraces such elements as love, companionship, affection, society, sexual rela-
tions, solace and more." Mfillington v. Southeastern Elevator Co, Inc., 22 N.Y.2d
498, 502, 239 NE.2d 897, 899, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (1968) (citations omitted)
(upholding right of wife to maintain action for loss of husband's services). As the
court noted in MiUington, the argument that these intangible damages are too
conjectural to measure is meritless, for this would mean that pain and suffering
damages likewise could not be compensable. Id. at 507, 239 N.E.2d at 902, 293
N.Y.S.2d at 312. The sole evidentiary distinction is the formal proof of marriage,
but status is not relevant to the determination of the quality of the injury. Final-
ly, the possibility of double recovery for emotional distress and consortium can be
avoided through adjustment of damages or a joint trial. Id. at 502, 239 N.E.2d at
899, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
3- Id. at 507-08, 239 N.E.2d at 902, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 311-12. Sca also Dolosovic
v. City, 143 Misc. 2d 801, 541 N.Y.S.2d 685 (New York County 1989), affd, 174
A.D.2d 407, 572 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 79 N.Y.2d 751, 588
N.E.2d 96, 580 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1991) (holding that consortium claim could be main-
tained by husband of mother who witnessed her two children run over by tractor




larity in the type of injury that is quantified in consortium
claims provides a useful, ready-to-use method to determine the
scope of damages in a negligently inflicted bystander emotional
distress action. 15 Thus the New York courts already have at
hand the tools to readily determine the validity of the
plaintiffs claim.
Courts that do allow negligently inflicted bystander emo-
tional distress claims have adopted rules which could also
serve as a model. In 1994 the New Jersey Supreme Court held
in Dunphy v. Gregor3" 6 that a fianc6 could recover damages
for emotional distress suffered as a result of watching her
fianc6, who was changing the tire on a friend's car, being
struck by another car and then dragged to his death. Noting
that "[tihe quality of the relationship creates the severity of
the loss," the court allowed recovery." 7 Finding that the de-
gree of harm suffered rested upon an investigation of the na-
ture of the relationship, the court found "no special obstacles in
the context of bystander liability.""8 In its decision, the court
noted that similar investigations were made into personal as-
pects of relationships in context, and proposed a set of factors
to use to evaluate the relationship."9 The decision recognized
31I See, e.g., Delosovic, 143 Misc. 2d at 812, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 693 ("'A zone of
danger' injury to a person's emotions is a violation of an independent duty of
reasonable care owed to that person and a spouse is therefore entitled to pursue a
consortium claim.").
316 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994).
317 Id. at 377-78.
318 Id. at 378.
311 Id. at 379 ("the fact that people are unmarried does not make that inquiry
any more intrusive or problematic"). The determination of the quality of the rela-
tionship
must be guided... "by a standard that focuses on those factors that
identify and defined the intimacy and familial nature of such a relation-
ship. That standard must take into account the duration of the relation-
ship, the degree of mutual dependence, the extent of common contribu-
tions of a life together, the extent and quality of shared experience
Id. at 378.
This list of factors is similar to those enumerated in Braschi. See supra note
312. These factors are thus general determinants for establishing the quality of a
relationship between two unmarried adults. The fact that they have been devel-
oped by different courts for different applications does not diminish their utility in
the negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress context; indeed, their similar-
ity underscores the premise that there is no cogent reason for not applying this
test to determine the scope of liability. For the evaluation of other types of rela-
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that the use of a standard which would enable the trier to
determine the depth of the relationship would not burden ei-
ther courts or defendants, and would result in substantial
justice for those suffering "indelibly stunning' emotional
injuries."32
CONCLUSION
This Note has tried to show that the denial of liability for
negligently inflicted bystander emotional distress in New York
is based upon grounds that the courts of the state have reject-
ed in a variety of other areas. Moreover, these grounds are not
even intellectually honest, since they rest upon unexamined
premises. The current law-a person can recover if they are an
immediate family member and are within the zone of dan-
ger-bears little or no relationship to the interest the tort
protects, or to the harm that people suffer. The continual re-
course to the bogeyman of unlimited liability is counterpro-
ductive because it undermines the legitimacy of the courts,
does not promote efficiency and fails to do justice to those who
can show that they have been injured by negligent acts. It is
possible to construct a standard that takes account of the need
to control liability and that promotes the values inherent in
significant relationships. The method for constructing this
standard already exists in the realm of due process jurispru-
dence, where both the Supreme Court and the New York Court
of Appeals have defined families in terms of their function.
Applying this rule to negligently inflicted bystander emotional
distress actions would go far toward reconciling the conflicts
inherent between abuse of the tort system and promoting jus-
tice.
The New York Court of Appeals has long recognized that
the reformation of the common law is its unique responsibili-
ty.32 l To date, the court has refused to revisit this issue,
tionships, such as those between children and their care-givers, the determination
could be made on the basis of whether the care-giver performs traditional child
rearing functions.
32 Id. at 377.
"2 "'We act in the finest common-law tradition when we adapt and alter deci-
sional law to produce common-sense justice." Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 355,
102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1951).
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choosing instead to rely on untested assumptions. In requiring
a multiplicity of requirements for recovery for emotional dis-
tress for bystanders, the court has clung to a rigid argument,
which, whatever its applicability years ago, has lost its under-
pinnings. In this age of increasing fragmentation of traditional
family structures and the consequent fraying of the social
fabric, it is ironic indeed that the law should find itself the
handmaiden of the forces unraveling the social fabric.
Thomas T. Uhl
